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CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE. 
I. SUMMARY CONTEMPT: IMMEDIATE, COMPELLING 
NEED REQUffiED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Gustafsonl the Ninth Citcuit held that there must 
be a compelling reason for immediate action before a court can 
use its summary contempt power.2 During final argument, the 
defense counsel urged the jury to consider the effect of a convic-
tion on the defendant's family. The prosecution objected and 
the court instructed the jury that sympathy was an impermissi-
ble basis for the verdict. Despite further warnings from the 
court, counsel continued his sympathy appeal, telling the jury 
that the bench and prosecution were "quashing and quelling this 
evidence of a defense counsel trying to do his level best for his 
client."S The court then recessed for the day, excused the jury, 
and summarily held the attorney in contempt. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that summary con-
tempt was inappropriate because there was no showing that the 
attorney's conduct caused a material obstruction to an ongoing 
trial. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a),' a judge 
1. 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ferguson, J., the other panel members were 
Ely, J., and Wright, J., dissenting). 
2. The crinlinal contempt power of the federal courts is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 401 
(1976) which provides in pertinent part: "A court of the United States shall have the 
power to punish by fine or inlprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its author-
ity, and none other as-(l) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto 
as to obstruct the administration of justice." Disposition of crinlinal contempts is con-
tained in FED. R. CRIM. P. 42. Rule 42(a) provides for summary disposition, see not.e 4 
infra, while rule 42(b) provides for disposition upon notice and hearing, see note 5 infra. 
3. 619 F.2d at 1356. 
4. FEn. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) provides: 
153 
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can summarily punish contemptuous conduct if committed in 
the court's presence and if the judge certifies that she or he wit-
nessed the conduct. Otherwise, there must be disposition with 
notice and a hearing ullder rule 42(b)}' Traditionally, the lack of 
notice and a, hearing has been justified by (1) the need to main-
tain order in the courtroom;6 (2) the availability of appellate re-
view to safeguard the ,contemnor's rights;? and (3) the wasteful-
ness of a second trial because the court itself witnessed the 
conduct.s 
Increasing sensitivity to due process rights has put further 
limitations on the summary contempt power. The Supreme 
Court has limited incarceration to a maximum of six months,9 
has held that summWJ disposition is unavailable if there is judi-
cial bias,lO and has recognized the conflict between an attorney's 
roles as an advocate for his or her client and as an officer of the 
court.11 The Supreme Court has required an actual obstruction 
of justice before SUlll1l!lary contempt is appropriate.12 
In Harris v. United States,18 the Supreme Court limited the 
summary contempt power to circumstances in which time is of 
the essence. This limitation has been put into doubt by the 
Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished 
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the con-
duct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in 
the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall 
recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of 
record. 
5. Rule 42(b) requires that notice be given by the judge in open court or on an 
application of the U.S. attorney or of an attorney appointed for that purpose, on an 
order to show cause or an arrest order. The alleged contemnor is entitled to a reasonable 
amount of time to prepare his or her case and to a jury trial. If the contempt involved 
judicial disrespect, then that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing. 
6. Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888). 
7. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952). 
8. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925). 
9. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974). 
10. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 9 (1971) (no summary contempt if the judge has 
demonstrated an attitude and position clearly adverse to the alleged contemnor); May-
berry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (no summary contempt if judge so grossly 
insulted that prejudice may be presumed); Oftbut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) 
(no summary contempt if judge becomes personally embroiled with the alleged 
contemnor). 
11. In re McConnel, 370 U.S. 30 (1962). 
12.Id. 
13. 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
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Court's decision, nine years later, in United States v. Wilson.14 
Many commentatorslG believe Wilson limited Harris to its fac· 
tual setting and re·established discretionary power in the trial 
court. Some courts, however,1s including the Ninth Circuit in 
Gustafson, believe that Wilson reaffirmed the time of the es· 
sence requirement. 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
The Majority Holding 
The majority found no compelling reasons for summary 
contempt in Gustafson because there was no material obstruc· 
tion or frustration of the proceedings, and therefore, no need for 
immediate action. The court noted17 that there was no disrup· 
tion of the trial,18 that summary contempt was not necessary as 
an incentive/s that the trial day ended normally,20 and.that the 
trial would not have been imperiled by a rule 42(b) hearing.21 
The majority relied upon United States v. Wilson,22 in which 
the Supreme Court held that summary contempt was appropri· 
ate when a witness refused to testify at trial even after a grant of 
immunity because (1) the witness' refusal to testify frustrated an 
ongoing proceeding; (2) the threat of summary contempt pro-
vided an incentive for the witness to testify; and (3) a full hear-
ing would have caused such a harmful delay as to imperil the 
trial. 
14. 421 U.S. 309 (1974). 
15. Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 
YALE L.J. 39 (1978); Note, United States v. Wilson: An Expansive Approach to the 
Power of the Federal Courts to Punish Contempts under rule 42(a) of the Federal 
Courts of Criminal Procedure, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 747 (1977); Kuhns, Limiting the Crimi-
nal Contempt Power: New Rules for the Prosecutor and Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REv. 
483 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975) (summary contempt may prop-
erly be applied to the orderly refusal of witnesses to testify at trial after grant of 
immunity). 
16. United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1979); Krueger v. State, 351 
So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
17. 619 F.2d at 1358. 
18. A reference to the Wilson Court's examination of the disruptiveness of the con-
temnor's conduct. See 421 U.S. at 316. 
19. A reference to the Wilson Court's finding that summary criminal contempt may 
be used as an incentive. See id. 
20. Sacher v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925). 
21. A reference to the Harris Court's consideration of whether the proceeding would 
be imperiled by a rule 42(b) hearing. See 382 U.S. at 164. 
22. 421 U.S. 309 (1974). 
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The Supreme Court distinguished Wilson from Harris,23 
where summary contempt was held inappropriate for an orderly 
refusal to testify before a grand jury. While a grand jury has 
many inquires before it, and can easily suspend action on any 
one case while a 42(b) contempt hearing is held, a trial court 
"cannot be expected to dart from case to case."2" The Supreme 
CQurt reasoned that a delay at trial not only adversely affects all 
individuals assembled for the trial, but has a rippling delay ef-
fect on all scheduled trials. The Wilson court concluded that 
"[w]here time is not of the essence, however, the provisions of 
Rule 42(b) may be more appropriate to deal with contemptuous 
conduct."25 
The majority did lrlot rule on whether the defense counsel's 
conduct was contemptuous because it reversed on the ground 
that summary disposition was inappropriate. They did, however, 
list factors to consider in determining whether an attorney's 
comments amount to Ii material obstruction sufficient to justify 
summary contempt. ,]~hese factors are (1) the reasonably ex-
pected reactions of those in the courtroom, (2) the manner in 
which the remarks ar«~ delivered, (3) the delay to the proceed-
ings caused by the disrespectful outburst, and (4) the failure to 
heed explicit directives of the COurt.26 
The Dissent 
Judge Wright, argued that summary contempt was appro-
priate because defense counsel's comments were per se contemp-
tuous27 and rule 42(a) requires only that the contempt be in the 
court's presence and certified by the judge. Judge Wright be-
lieved the majority rewrote rule 42(a) by adding requirements of 
a material obstruction and an immediate need for action. Sum-
mary contempt power, he argued, is necessary for immediate 
vindication of the court's dignity and authority, and the trial 
judge should be allowed discretion.28 Judge Wright construed 
23. 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
24. 421 U.S. at 318. 
25. [d. at 319. 
26. 619 F.2d at 1359. 
27. Judge Wright stated that an attorney's comments which are disrespectful to the 
court are per se contemptuous. Specifically, he focused on the attorney's charge of collu-
sion between the bench and the prosecutor. 619 F.2d at 1362-63. 
28. 619 F.2d at 1365 (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925». 
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Wilson as a literal reading of rule 42(a).and as leaviIig discretion 
with the trial court. The dissent stressed29 that the Wilson 
Court said "[ w ] here time is not of the essence. . . the provisions 
of rule 42(b) may be more appropriate," and that time be of the 
essence is not a requirement, but a discretionary factor left with 
the trial judge. 
The dissent also stated that the majority departed from its 
own precedents by ignoring MacInnis v. United States,30 where 
counsel's disrespectful comments were held per se contemptuous 
and therefore summarily punishable; and wrongly relied upon 
Gordon v. United States31 where counsel was held liable to sum-
mary contempt for his disrespectful comments. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION 
The crucial difference between the majority and dissenting 
opinions lies in their interpretations of United States v. Wilson. 
The majority's reading that there must be a breakdown of the 
trial and a compelling reason for immediate action by the court 
before the summary contempt power can be exercised is the bet-
ter position for it recognizes that summary contempt is a drastic 
remedy whose application should be limited. 
The dissent's position that disrespectful comments are per 
se contemptuous and therefore subject to immediate vindication 
of authority by the court, ignores Supreme Court decisions. 
MacInnis v. United States,32 cited by the dissent, was decided 
in 1951, before the Supreme Court made a series of rulings re-
garding summary contempt and disrespect to the COurt.33 While 
these cases focused on the problem of biased judges exercising 
the summary contempt power, they indicated that disrespectful 
comments are not per se subject to summary contempt, and 
may, because of the hostility the comments may engender in the 
trial court judge, require that the judge step down and a rule 
29. 619 F.2d at 1365-66. 
30. 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952). The circuit court 
stated, "The act of addressing the court in open session with the statements 'you should 
cite yourself for misconduct' and 'you ought to be ashamed of yourself', unmodified, are, 
per se, contemptuous." 191 F.2d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1951). 
31. 592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979). 
32. 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952). 
33. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
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42(b) hearing be held. 
The dissent also ignored the Supreme Court decision in In 
re McConnel,s" where the Court held there must be an actual 
obstruction of justice before summary power is available for dis-
respectful comments made by an attorney. The more recent 
Ninth Circuit decisions regarding the appropriateness of sum-
mary contempt for disrespect shown by counsel toward the court 
require a showing of both contemptuous conduct and material 
obstruction. S5 
Neither is time of the essence a new requirement by the 
Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Abascals6 the Ninth Circuit 
ruled on a similar fact pattern and examined whether time was 
of the essence. During the noon recess, the alleged contemnor in 
Abascal failed to step forward as ordered by the court. While 
the court of appeals found that the conduct was contemptuous, 
the court ruled summary contempt was inappropriate because 
there was no threat to an ongoing proceeding, nor would any 
proceeding be imperiled by a full contempt hearing under rule 
42(b). 
What the dissent failed to appreciate in this case was that, 
at the time of the contempt citation, the court was in recess. 
Counsel was not interrupting any proceeding at the time cited 
and the court could easily have, and should have, held a rule 
42(b) proceeding. 
The Effect of the Deci.sion 
It is possible that future Ninth Circuit decisions might up-
hold a summary contempt citation for the same behavior as dis-
played by Gustafson if the judge cited the attorney during trial. 
34. 370 u.S. 230 (1962). 
35. Hawk v. Cardoza, 575 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The need for judicial order 
is not fixed but must be considered in the context of each case. The length of a trial, 
surrounding controversy, prior warnings from the trial judge and prior conduct of the 
contemnor are among factors which must be considered in assessing the validity of sum-
mary contempt citations:"); United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975); Weiss 
v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 984 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Due process requires that contemnors, such 
as Weiss, who are not cited and simultaneously punished for the purpose of restoring 
courtroom decorum or protecting the safety of court officials are entitled to an opportu-
nity for allocution". (Footnotes omitted». 
36. 509 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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In a case cited with approval by the majority, Gordon v. United 
States,81 a pro se publico defendant88 was held in summary con-
tempt for a speech attacking the court. The majority cited 
Gordon as requiring a material obstruction of justice before the 
utterer of disrespectful comments can be held contemptuous 
and liable to summary punishment. The majority distinguished 
Gustafson from Gordon, where summary contempt was upheld, 
because "the conduct at issue had caused 'not insubstantial' and 
'entirely unnecessary' delays which substantially disrupted the 
trial. "39 While the Gordon court spoke of the hearing becoming 
as much of a contempt proceeding as a probation revocation,40 
thus indicating a substantial disruption, it is. possible to imagine 
later courts focusing on the trial judge's comment that he could 
either hold Gordon in contempt or consider him a "harmless nut 
and forget it"41 and conclude that there doesn't really have to be 
a compelling reason for immediate action. 
Further evidence of the possibility that Gustafson may be 
limited to out-of-trial settings is the majority's reliance on 
United States v. Brannon.42 Brannon held there must be a com-
pelling reason for immediate action before summary contempt is 
permissible. In Brannon, a witness refused to testify at trial. 
The witness was not summarily held in contempt at that time 
but only after the trial was finished. The Fifth Circuit ruled the 
delay was fatal to the summary contempt citation, noting that a 
compelling reason for its use existed at the time of the witness' 
refusal, but not at the end of trial. Thus, future Ninth Circuit 
decisions could focus on the same distinction made in Brannon, 
concluding Gustafson, like Brannon, is meant to apply only to 
contemptuous acts outside of the actual trial. 
On the other hand., the majority did focus on Gustafson's 
behavior at trial, and not on whether the summary contempt ci-
37. 592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979). 
38. The court's opinion did not focus on the fact that Gustafson was an attorney, 
but rather upon the conduct he displayed. Therefore, the fact that Gordon was a pro se 
publico defendant does not seem an important distinction. It is important to note that 
because the Gustafson court did not appear to limit its holding to attorneys, it should 
apply to any contemnor. 
39. 619 F.2d at 1360. 
40. 592 F.2d at 1218. 
41. ld. at 1218 n.2. 
42. 546 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977). 
7
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tation actually was made during the trial or not. Additionally, 
the majority repeatedly stressed that summary contempt was a 
harsh remedy, that due process guarantees dictate that summary 
contempt be used sparingly, and that the power to punish for 
contempt should always be limited to "the best possible power 
adequate to the end proposed."43 
E. CONCLUSION 
The summary contempt power has been much critized as a 
denial of due process.44 Several commentators have suggested 
that the threat of a criminal contempt conviction upon a later 
hearing is sufficient to allow the court to maintain its authority 
while safeguarding the contemnor's rights. The Ninth Circuit is 
taking a step in the right direction by recognizing that summary 
contempt "is a drastic remedy and should be used only when 
there is a compelling reason for immediate action. 
Patricia A. Seitas* 
II. THE NINTH CmCUIT PROHffiITS RANDOM NIGHT-
TIME STOPS OF BOATS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Piner,l the Ninth Circuit held that ran-
dom nighttime safety checks of boats violate the fourth amend-
43. 619 F.2d at 1361. 
44. Note, Counsel and Contempt: A Suggestion that the Summary Power Be Elimi-
nated, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 289 (1980); Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique 
and a New Perspective, 88 YJ.LE L.J. 39 (1978); Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power 
and the Constitution: the View from Within and Without, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1976), 
Note, Direct Criminal Contempt: An Analysis of Due Process and Jury Trial Rights, 11 
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 77 (1975); Note, Taylor v. Hayes-a Case Study in the Use of 
" Summary Contempt Against an Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945 (1975); N. DOMEN & L. 
FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT (1973); Note, Attorneys and the Summary Contempt 
Sanction, 25 ME. L. REV. 89 (1973); Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Sug-
gestion that Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribu-
nal, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 463 (1966). 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. Sept., 1979) (per Merrill, J.; the other panel members were 
King, D. J., sitting by designation, and Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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ment.2 While on night patrol in the San Francisco Bay, United 
States Coast Guard officers saw defendants' forty-three-foot 
pleasure boat between Tiburon and Angel Island. Coast Guard 
officers boarded the sailboat to conduct "a routine safety inspec-
tion."s The officers had neither probable cause nor a reasonable 
suspicion that defendants were violating any law or regulation. 
Stepping on board, one of the officers observed what he thought 
were bags of marijuana in a cabin below deck. The officers im-
mediately arrested the defendants. The Coast Guard seized and 
searched the boat, uncovering over two tons of marijuana. The 
defendants were indicted for importation of, possession with in-
tent to distribute, and conspiracy to import and distribute 
marijuana. " 
At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence of 
the marijuana on the ground that the stop constituted an unrea-
sonable seizure under the fourth amendment. The district court 
granted the motion. IS The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying 
predominantly on the recent Supreme Court decision in Dela-
ware v. Prouse,6 which held unconstitutional random stops of 
automobiles. The Ninth Circuit extended the Prouse decision to 
apply to random nighttime stops of boats. The Piner court held 
that without at least a "reasonable and articulable"'l suspicion of 
noncompliance with safety regulations, the fourth amendment 
proscribes the random stop and boarding of a boat after dark for 
a safety and registration inspection.8 
2. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
son or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3. 608 F.2d at 359. 
4. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) proscribes the importation of marijuana; 21 U.S.C. § 
963 (1976) proscribes the conspiracy to import marijuana; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) 
proscribes the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; and 21 U.S.C. § 846 
(1976) proscribes the conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. 
S. United States v. Piner, 452 F.Supp. 1335 (N.D.Cal. 1978). 
6. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
7. 608 F.2d at 361. 
8. [d. 
9
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B. Two FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONS 
On their face, federal statutes9 appear to give the Coast 
Guard plenary power to, at any time, stop and search any vessel 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has severely limited the scope of these statutes,I° although 
other circuits have wholeheartedly accepted them.ll This discord 
among the circuits revolves around the constitutionality of two 
fourth amendment excl~ptions: stops and searches at the border, 
and stops by administrative agencies.12 
9. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides: 
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspec-
tions, searches, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over 
which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, 
detention, and suppression of violations of laws of the United 
States. For such purposes • . . officers may at any time go on 
board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction . . • of the 
United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine 
the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and 
search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel com-
pliance . . • • (Emphasis added). 
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976) provides: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any 
vessel •.• at any place in the United States or within the 
customs waters or. . • within a customs-enforcement area. . . 
or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his 
district . • • and examine, inspect, and search the vessel . . • 
and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or 
cargo on board • • • • (Emphasis added). 
19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1976) defines "customs waters" as extending four leagues (about 12 
nautical miles) from the coast. 
10. United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 
(1977) (Coast Guard is subject to the limitations imposed by the fourth amendment); 
United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976) (a stop under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) 
(1976) requires probable cause or a search warrant unless a border stop); United States 
v. Jones, 528 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1975) (dictum) (land search 
allowed under § 1581(a) of a boat being transported via a trailer would violate the fourth 
amendment). 
11. United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.) (the fourth amendment does 
not prohibit document inspections in the absence of any suspicion in customs waters), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(upheld a stop under § 1581(a»; United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.) (up-
held a stop and search under § 89(a», rev'd on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (1980). 
United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.) (upholding border search under § 1581(a», 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969). 
12. A third exception, exigent circumstances, is also used to bypass the Fourth 
Amendment requirements. The scope of this Note, however, is limited to random stops 
where exigent circumstances do no exist. See Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, 
The Fourth Amendment, am! Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REV. 725 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as High on the Seas]. 
10
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The Border Stop and Search Exception 
A warrantless stop and search at a border or its functional 
equivalents need not be based on consent or probable cause of 
an existing violation. The border search exception is based on an 
interest in "national self preservation [which] reasonably re-
quire[s] one entering the country to identify himself to come in, 
and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought 
in. "l3 Although the Supreme Court has never considered cases 
challenging the constitutionality of a border stop and search of a 
vessel,14 in recent decisions, the Court limited the scope of bor-
der searches of automobiles. lIS 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,16 a roving border pa-
trol stopped defendant about twenty-five air miles from the 
Mexican border to search for illegal aliens. The government jus-
tified the warrantless search on section 287(a)(3) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act,l'1 which grants the border patrol 
power to search without a warrant any vehicle within a "reason-
able distance"l8 from the border. The search unveiled marijuana 
instead of illegal aliens. The Court held that the search violated 
the fourth amendment because it was based on neither consent 
nor probable cause to believe a violation had occurred.19 The 
Court also found that routine border searches are only permissi-
13. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1924) (dictum). 
14. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following cases involving border 
stops and searches of vessels: United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1838 (1980); United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 422 (1979); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978); United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1977); United States v. Jones, 528 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
425 U.S. 960 (1975); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
1121 (1968). 
15. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975), see text accompanying 
note 23 infra; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), see text accompanying notes 
21 & 22 infra; United States v. Brignono·Pounce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (upheld a roving 
border patrol stop based on "specific articulable facts"); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), see text accompanying notes 16-20 infra. 
16. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976) provides that "if [a]ny officer or employee of the 
Service authorized under regulations proscribed by the Attorney General shall have 
power without warrant. . . within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of 
the United States, to board and search for aliens •..• " 
18. A "reasonable distance" is usually defined as 100 air miles from any external 
boundary of the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1980). 
19. 413 U.S. at 274-75. 
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ble at the border or at the "functional equivalent."2o The Court 
gave two examples of aL "functional equivalent" of a border: a 
station near the border where two roads from the border join, 
and an airport terminal where flights from other countries are 
received. 
In United States IJ. Ortiz,21 the Supreme Court extended 
Almeida-Sanchez to hold unconstitutional random, warrantless 
searches conducted at established border stops. In Ortiz, the de-
fendant was stopped at a border checkpoint sixty-two miles 
north of the Mexican border. Although the Border Patrol officer 
had no reason to believe defendant was transporting illegal 
aliens, he instructed defendant to open the trunk of his car. In 
the trunk were three illegal aliens. The Supreme Court held that 
without either consent or probable cause, a warrantless search 
by border patrol officers at traffic checkpoints removed from the 
bord~r or its functional equivalent violated the fourth amend-
ment.22 In a subsequent case, however, the Supreme Court up-
held brief questioning at permanent traffic checkpoints even 
though the Almeida-Sanchez requirements were not met.2S 
The Administrative Stop and Search Exception 
A warrantless stop and search by an administrative agency, 
based on neither consent nor probable cause, can only be con-
ducted of industries under strict federal control. The adminis-
trative search was created to deter violations of regulations by 
subjecting certain indlllStries to random inspection. In Camara v. 
Municipal Court~4 the Supreme Court addressed the conflict be-
tween the fourth amEmdment and administrative searches. In 
Camara, a city housing inspector was making a routine annual 
inspection of an apartment building25 when defendant refused to 
20. [d. at 272-73. 
21. 422 U.S. 891 (1975). 
22. [d. at 896-97. 
23. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975). 
24. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
25. Section 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code provides: 
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agen-
cies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their 
duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the 
right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or 
premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them 
by the Municipal Code. 
12
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allow the inspector access to his apartment without a search 
warrant. The Supreme Court held that under the fourth amend-
ment the defendant had a constitutional right to insist that the 
inspector obtain a search warrant before allowing him entry into 
his residence.2s In See v. City of Seattle,27 the Court extended 
the Camara rule to apply to businesses, holding that the defen-
dant in See had a constitutional right to insist that a fire inspec-
tor obtain a warrant prior to entry.2S 
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,29 the Su-
preme Court again considered the constitutionality of warrant-
less administrative searches. Defendant, a retail liquor dealer, 
refused federal agents entry into a locked storeroom. Without a 
search warrant or probable cause, the agents broke the lock, 
found illegal liquor inside and seized it as evidence. The Su-
preme Court found the See rule inapplicable in Colonnade be-
cause a person in the liquor industry knew at the time he re-
ceived his license that the industry was under strick federal 
regulation and that Congress had established sanctions for ob-
structing warrantless searches.30 In United States v. Biswell,31 
the Supreme Court extended the Colonnade rationale to the 
firearms industry. More recently, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,32 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Biswell-Colonnade exception 
to the See rule.33 
11 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HOUSING CODE § 503 (1964), reprinted in Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
26. 387 U.S. at 539. 
27. 387 U.S. at 541. 
28. The Seattle Fire Code § 8.01.050, reprinted in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 
541 (1967), allows warrantless inspections of all buildings, except the interior of prem-
ises, to correct any conditions which may cause fires. 
29. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
30. [d. at 77. 
31. 406 U.S. 311 (1972), construed in Almeida·Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 
266 (1973). 
32. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
33. In Marshall, the Supreme Court held warrantless searches under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) unconstitutional unless fourth amendment 
requirements were met. Section 8(a) of OSHA allows the Secretary to enter and inspect 
any work area and to inspect all machinery to look for violations of regulations. Speaking 
to the Secretary's efforts to apply inspections under OSHA to the Biswell-Colonnade 
exception, the Court said that "[c]ertain industries have .•. a history of government 
oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the 
stock of such enterprise." 436 U.S. at 313 (citation omitted). Both the liquor (Colonnade) 
and firearm (Biswell) industries are within this delineation because a person engaging in 
either "has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regula-
13
Seitas et al.: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
166 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:160 
Although the Supreme Court has not decided the constitu-
tionality of administrative stops of vessels, in its recent decision 
of Delaware v. Prouse,1H the Court held an administrative auto-
mobile stop unconstitutional. In Prouse, a highway patrolman 
stopped defendant to check his driver's license and automobile 
registration. The patrolman had no probable cause to stop be-
cause he did not observe, and had no suspicion of, any traffic 
violation. The patrolman, however, smelled, and subsequently 
saw, marijuana in plailll view.311 
The trial court held that the random stop, being wholly ca-
pricious, violated the fourth amendment and granted defen-
dant's motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana. The 
Supreme Court affirmed.3S Noting that the purpose of the fourth 
amendment is to maintain a standard of "reasonableness"37 
upon the discretionary power of government officials, the Court 
adopted a two-part balancing test:38 first, the intrusion of a par-
ticular law-enforcemellt practice on an individual's fourth 
amendment interests L'3 balanced against its promotion of a le-
gitimate governmental interest, second, the facts on which the 
intrusion is based must be measured against an objective stan-
dard.39 The Prouse Court went on to endorse checkpoint stops 
as an alternative to ra:ndom ones.40 
C. THE COURT'S .ANAJ~YSIS 
The Majority 
Relying predominantly on Prouse, the Piner court upheld 
tions." I d. 
34. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
35. For an admissible plain view seizure, the officer must have a right to be where he 
is when he sees the item, the item must be in plain view, the item must have a nexus to 
criminality and the discovery must be inadvertant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971). 
36. 440 U.S. at 663. • 
37. Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
38. 440 U.S. at 654. 
39. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30 (1968), the objective standard was whether an 
officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 
The Prouse Court also adopted as an alternative to the probable cause requirement the 
determination by a neutral and detached magistrate that the standard has been met. 440 
U.S. at 654 (citing Mincey v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385 (1978». 
40. 440 U.S. at 656-57 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975». See text accompanying notes 15 & 21-23 
supra. 
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the motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence.41 The Piner 
court extended the Prouse rationale to hold random nighttime 
stops of boats unconstitutional. Adopting the Prouse balancing 
test, the Piner court determined that the governmental need for 
random boat stops does not outweigh the concern, annoyance, 
and fright an individual experiences when subject to such stops 
at night.42 Reasoning that the purpose of random stops is to dis-
courage noncompliance with safety regulations, the Piner court 
found random daytime stops sufficient to deter safety regulation 
violations while creating less annoyance and fright in the aver-
age boat owner. The court further held that nighttime stops 
should be allowed only where there is cause to suspect noncom-
pliance with safety regulations. 
The Piner court acknowledged the statutory authority for 
random boat stops,4s but distinguished commercial boats from 
pleasure crafts!4 The Piner court also recognized statutory au-
thority for customs inspections parallel to that for random boat 
stops,41S and cited Fifth Circuit cases which relied on these stat-
utes to hold random boat stops constitutional!6 Yet, the Piner 
court chose not to follow either the statutory authority allowing 
random boat stops or the Fifth Circuit cases supporting them. 
Instead, the Piner court relied on Prouse4? in finding random 
nighttime stops unconstitutional.4s 
The Dissent 
Judge Kennedy dissented on several grounds. First, he dis-
tinguished Prouse from Piner on the ground that the Prouse de-
cision was limited to random stops of automobiles. The dissent 
noted that the Prouse decision was based on the limited produc-
41. 608 F.2d at 361. 
42. Id. 
43. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976). The statutory language is set forth in supra note 9. 
44. Under 33 C.F.R. §§ 175.1 & 177.01 (1980), safety equipment are required on 
pleasure boats only when the boat is in use. Commercial boats are required to comply 
with safety regulations at all times, even when the boat is not in use. 
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). The statutory language is set forth in supra note 9. 
46. United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. War-
ren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978). 
47. 608 F.2d at 360-61. 
48. The district court found Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), See v. 
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) 
controlling in holding random boat stops unconstitutional. See text accompanying notes 
24-33 supra. 
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tivity of random automobile stopS,-49 a limitation not present in 
random stops of boats.60 
The dissent argued that the less intrusive alternatives the 
Prouse Court suggested for insuring that automobile drivers 
complied with safety regulations51 were unavailable to random 
boat stopS.52 The dissent also criticized the majority's alternative 
of limiting random stops to the daytime as going against the ba-
sic purpose of random stops. The dissent argued that random 
stops were created to promote safety, and to allow nighttime vi-
olators to go undetected would be more dangerous than to allow 
daytime violators to go unchecked. 
The dissent also argued that random stops by the Coast 
Guard are allowed by statute.58 The dissent traced the powers 
vested in the Coast Guard back to their origin. 54 Section thirty-
one of the Revenue Cutter Act of 1790, the dissent observed, 
placed no limitations on boat inspectors and, more importantly, 
49. Although no statistics were given, the Prouse Court noted that "the number of 
licensed drivers who will be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be large 
indeed." ~O U.S. at 660. 
50. In his dissent, Judge Kennedy observed that approximately 40% of the boats 
stopped in 1977 were not in compliance with safety regulations. 608 F.2d at 362. 
51. The dissent suggested three alternatives: 1) stopping observed violators. Once 
stopped, license and registration papers could be checked to see what, if any, other regu-
lations have been violated; 2) requiring an annual safety inspection would prevent viola-
tors from eluding the law. Upon passing this inspection, a sticker is issued and must be 
displayed; 3) establishing road block stops. 608 F.2d at 362. 
52. The first alternative, stopping visible violators, is unavailable because many, if 
not all, boat safety violations can only be discovered by boarding and taking inventory of 
required items. Such items are normally kept below deck unless needed. The second 
alternative, annual inspection!!, is unavailable to boats because safety equipment is nor-
mally kept at home until the boat is used. The third alternative, road block stops, is 
impractical unless particular throughfares are established on which road blocks can be 
put. 608 F.2d at 362. 
53. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). The language of both stat-
utes are set forth in note 9 silpra. 
" 54. The dissent argued that the Coast Guard's authority to board vessels originated 
in § 31 of the Revenue Cutter Service Act of 1790 which provided: 
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, survey-
ors, inspectors, and the officers of the revenue cutters . . • to 
go on board of snips or vessels in any part of the United 
States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to 
the United States, whether in or out of their respective dis-
tricts, for the purpose of demanding the manifests aforesaid, 
and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels; and 
the said officera respectively shall have free access to the 
cabin, and every other part of the ship or vessel . . . . 
16
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was created by the same Congress that proposed the fourth 
amendment. In addition, this statute left the right to randomly 
stop and search a vessel unqualified while limiting such a stop 
and search of a "vehicle, beast or person" to those based on a 
"reasonable cause to suspect" a violation.1I11 The dissent found 
further support for distinguishing stops of boats from stops of 
automobiles in Maul v. United States.1I6 Justices Brandeis and 
Holmes, concurring in that case, argued that there was "no limi-
tation" on a warrantless seizure of a vessel while the seizure of 
"persons, papers and effects" was limited by the Constitution.1I7 
The dissent argued that Piner should come within the Bis-
well-Colonnade exception for activities under strict federal regu-
lation. The dissent maintained that the governmental interest in 
insuring safety coupled with 200 years of federal regulation more 
than qualified random boat stops under this limited exception. 
Finally, the dissent argued that the defendants had no legit-
imate expectation of privacy because the marijuana was in plain 
view. The dissent argued that the Coast Guard officers only 
stepped onto the exposed deck of the defendants' boat and vio-
lated no legitimate expectation of privacy. Once there, the mari-
juana was subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine. This 
argument assumes that the Coast Guard had a right to be on the 
exposed deck of the boat. 
D. THE Piner DECISION CRITICIZED 
Factually, Piner and Prouse are similar in many ways. Both 
cases involved a stop based on neither probable cause nor rea-
sonable suspicion of a safety violation,158 both stops occurred in 
the early evening,1I9 and both involved seized marijuana in plain 
view.60 The major factual difference between the two cases is 
that Piner involved a boat and Prouse an automobile. The 
courts, however, came to different results. Although the Prouse 
Court held random automobile stops unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment, the Piner court only found random night-
55.ld. § 3. 
5S. 274 U.S. 501 (1927). 
57. ld. at 524. 
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time boat stops unreasonable. Following the holding in Prouse, 
the Piner court should have ruled all random boat stops uncon-
stitutional. Had the Piner court so held, the Ninth Circuit could 
have suggested, as a less intrusive alternative, a system of an-
nual safety inspections for boats similar to that presently used 
in most states for annual safety inspections of automobiles.61 
Less burdensome alternatives to random boat stops were 
suggested in a recent la.w review article.62 One alternative was to 
establish inspection staLtions, either temporary or permanent, at 
centrally located ports along the coast.6S Following a successful 
inspection, decals would be issued for display near the boat's 
name. The color of the decals cowd be changed each year to in-
sure each boat was inspected annually. Boats without valid de-
cals could be stopped and inspected, because inspectors would 
have probable cause to. believe that these boats either failed the 
first inspection or had never been inspected. 
The burdens imposed by the annual safety check alternative 
on the average boat owner would be minimal compared to those 
of a random stop system since the owner would have the choice 
of when, within certain time limitations, the inspection would be 
conducted. Such a system may take several years to implement, 
but once established, the intrusiveness on the individual boat 
owner would be no more than that which the average automobile 
owner faces today. AmlUal safety checks would also be more effi-
cacious than random stops because all boats would be subject to 
annual inspections, not just those chosen at random. 
E. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF Piner 
As a practical matter, nighttime boat stops and searches are 
still permissible. Since Almeida-Sanchez, in which the Supreme 
Court upheld ~earches at' borders and their functional 
equivalents, the Ninth Circuit has held that a bay is the "func-
61. Thirty states require periodic safety inspections. For example, New York law 
provides that all vehicles must be inspected annually and must bear a certificate of a 
successful inspection. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 301 - 305 (McKinney 1970). 
62. See High on the Seas, supra note 12, at 744-50. 
63. Other suggested alternatives include dockside safety checks to motivate the 
purchase of safety equipment and random lottery of certain characteristics of the boat, 
such as last three numbers of the boat identification number or certain types of boats. 
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tional equivalents" of a border.a. This interpretation, however, 
applies only to vessels which have crossed an international bor-
der.61$ In cases similar to Piner, a stop and search of a boat in a 
bay could be conducted as a border search if the Coast Guard 
learns that the boat to be searched had recently crossed an in-
ternational border.6s Such knowledge could be obtained either 
directly through inquiry to the boat owner or indirectly via a 
radio call to a central Coast Guard station. In Piner, neither was 
attempted. Such inquiries should be made in the future. If it 
were learned that the boat had recently sailed in foreign waters, 
a warrantless search could be conducted, at day or at night, as a 
border search even if neither probable cause nor reasonable sus-
picion of a violation existed"~'1 
Robinson R. Ng* 
Ill. NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS BERRY STANDARD FOR 
NEW TRIALS BASED UPON PERJURED TES-
TIMONY 
In United States v. Krasny,! a case of first impression, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the traditional stan-
dard2 for new trial motions based upon perjured testimony by a 
material government witness. Rejecting a more liberal standard 
applied by a majority of the circuits in cases involving perjured 
or recanted testimony, the court chose not to distinguish be-
tween perjured testimony and other types of newly discovered 
evidence. 
64. United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975). 
65. [d. at 1372. 
66. In United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit held 
that border searches apply to boats leaving the United States as well as those coming in. 
67. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text. 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Chambers, J., and Ely, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980). 
2. The traditional standard was first set forth in Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 527 
(1851). See note 23 infra and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit never explicitly 
referred to Berry, but did rely on United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 902 (1976), which cited Berry. 
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A. FACTS OF THE CAS]~ 
Defendant, Krasny, was convicted on charges of conspiracy 
to import heroin into the United States and to possess heroin 
with intent to distribute.8 He subsequently filed a motion for 
new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 
(rule 33):' The defendant based his motion upon the discovery 
of evidence subsequent to the trial allegedly showing perjury by . 
a material government witness. The witness, one of Krasny's ac-
complices, according to information proffered by the govern-
ment, lied at trial regarding the extent of her prior criminal ac-
tivity. During the trial, the witness offered testimony stressing 
Krasny's role as principal in the conspiracy, playing down her 
own part. Krasny's defense of duress at trial was rebutted 
largely by this witness' testimony and her cooperation with gov-
ernment agents in producing tapes of incriminating conversa-
tions with Krasny. Krasny argued that his duress defense was 
more credible in light of the new evidence. Ii 
The district court denied the motion for new trial on the 
sole ground that the new evidence was cumulative and would 
not have changed the jury's verdict.6 
3. 607 F.2d at 841. Defendant's conviction was based on violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1), 846, 952, 963 (1970). 
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. '!'he rule was promulgated by the United States Supreme 
Court as Rule IT of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U.S. 661 (1934), and 
amended by Congress in accOl:dance with its statutory authority in 1966. In relevant part 
the rule provides: 
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to 
him if required in the interest of justice. • . • A motion for a 
new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
may be made only before or within two years after final judg-
ment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the mo-
tion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial 
based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after 
verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the 
court may fix during the 7-day period. 
Some commentators have suggested that there should be no time limit for motions 
based on newly discovered evidence. See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 557 (1969). The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, approved by the 
American Bar Association, have discontinued the 2-year limit for motions for new trial 
based upon newly discovered evidence. Instead, rule 552 of the Uniform Rules provides 
that the motion must be made with reasonable diligence. See D. EpSTEIN & D. AUSTERN, 
UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS, ABA Criminal Jus-
tice Section 156 (1975). 
5. 607 F.2d at 842. 
6. Id. The district judge's one sentence opinion stated as follows: "I find that the 
20
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The court of appeals found the lower court record insuffi-
cient to determine whether the district judge had abused his dis-
cretion in applying the standard for the motion for new trial. As 
a result, the appellate court vacated and remanded the judgment 
to the district court for a factual determination of the basis for 
the denial.7 The Ninth Circuit held that district courts must ap-
ply the following standard to determine whether perjured testi-
mony requires a new trial: (1) the evidence must be discovered 
after the trial; (2) the discovery after trial must not have been 
caused by a lack of diligence by the defendant's attorney; (3) the 
evidence must be material to the issues and not merely cumula-
tive or impeaching; and, (4) the evidence at a new trial would 
probably result in acquittal. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Rule 33 confers upon district courts the power to grant a 
new trial if it is "in the interest of justice" to do SO.8 Most new 
trial motions are predicated upon violations of constitutional 
guarantees.9 However, motions for new trial based upon newly 
discovered evidence are not. Motions based on this ground are 
considered checks on the fallibility of the criminal justice sys-
tem, insuring "the integrity of the factfinding process and a fair 
trial for the accused . . . . "10 
District judges may exercise broad discretion in ruling upon 
motions for new trial. l1 If granted, the prosecution can make no 
appeal of the order.12 District judges are accorded such latitude 
in ruling upon motions for new trial because their personal ob-
servation at the trial facilitates the decision-making process.18 
suggested new evidence is at best cumulative and would not be of sufficient import to 
alter the jury's determination in this matter in terms of guilt or innocence." The govern-
ment argued, apparently successfully, that the taped conversations sufficiently showed 
the defendant's guilt, and that in comparison, the credibility of the witness was 
insignificant. 
7. ld. at 846. 
8. FEn. R. CRIM. P. 33. 
9. There are many grounds for motions for new trial. For example, jury misconduct, 
misconduct of the prosecuting attorney, violation of the right to counsel, improper rul-
ings on evidence. 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 33.03[4], at 33-16 to 33-17 (2d ed. 
1980). 
10. ld. 11 33.06[1], at 33-52. 
11. 5 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 295 (1967). 
12.ld. 
13. Note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 316 (1955). 
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This is especially true in the case of motions for new trial based 
upon newly discovered evidence, in which the district judge 
must determine the effect of the newly discovered evidence on 
the jury's verdict. I" The scope of appellate review is limited to a 
determination of whether the district judge abused his or her 
discretion in ruling upon the motion.11I 
Courts seldom grant motions for new triall6 because, in the 
interest of finality, district judges avoid granting costly retrials 
unlikely to result in a different verdict.17 This is especially true 
if the newly discovered evidence consists of perjured or recanted 
testimony. IS The typical case involves a recantation of testimony 
by a material government witness who was the defendant's ac-
complice.19 District judges are reluctant to believe recantations 
by accomplices because of the disincentives for accomplices to 
admit testifying falsely and the likelihood of bribery and collu-
sion between the accomplice and the defendant.20 Thus, judges 
are persuaded only by overwhelming evidence that the testi-
mony at trial was faJse. Even if persuaded, judges hesitate to 
grant new trials on the basis of recanted or perjured testimony 
presented by defendants' accomplices. This is because the testi-
mony may have been accorded little weight at trial since juries 
may properly consider the credibility of an accomplice's 
testimony. 
District courts apply different standards for evaluating mo-
tions for new trial depending upon the grounds for the motion. 
In general, the severiity of the standard varies inversely with the 
14. [d. 
15. [d. at 317. 
16. 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 33.06 (2d ed. 1980). For historical support, see 
L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 510, 511 (1947), which dis-
cusses the history of the motion, and notes that new trials were unknown at common law 
until the 17th century. 
17. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
909 (1964). 
18. Perjured and recanted testimony cases present substantially similar issues, and 
the courts regard these cases as being of one type. One commentator has suggested that 
the only difference between perjured and recanted testimony is the practical considera-
tion of proof. 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 33.05 (2d ed. 1980). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the 
defendant's accomplice recanted his testimony by telling "a pack of lies" in the hopes of 
helping his friend get parole. 
20. 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 175 (1971). 
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gravity of the misconduct at the trial.21 
The Berry Standard 
In Berry v. Georgia,22 the Georgia Supreme Court set forth 
a standard for new trial motions based upon newly discovered 
evidence. The Berry standard requires that the defendant sat-
isfy the court: 
1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge 
since the trial. 2nd. That it was not owing to want 
of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. 
That it is so material that it would probably pro-
duce a different verdict, if the new trial were 
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only-viz.; 
speaking to facts, in relation to which there was 
evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of 
the witness himself should be produced, or its ab-
sence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not 
be granted if the only object of the testimony is 
to impeach the character or credit of a witness.28 
The Larrison Standard 
Many courts apply the Berry standard to motions for new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence.24 A majority of the cir-
cuit courts, however, have applied a more liberal standard when 
the newly discovered evidence involves perjured or recanted tes-
timony. In Larrison v. United States,2G the standard was first 
applied in a case involving recanted testimony. The Larrison 
standard requires that a new trial be granted when: 
(a) the court is reasonably well satisfied that the 
testimony given by a material witness is false, 
21. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d at 514. 
22. 10 Ga. 511 (1851). In Berry, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor had un-
successfully attempted to elicit an admission of guilt by means of deceit. The court de-
nied the motion for new trial holding that the evidence did not meet the standard set 
forth above, because it most likely would have been inadmissible at trial and "it estab-
lished nothing." ld. at 528. 
23. ld. at 527. (emphasis added). 
24. E.g., United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1977) (failure of government 
to locate witness, later available to testify); United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260 (7th 
Cir. 1972) (new evidence that witness previously unwilling to testify was now willing). 
25. 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). In Larrison the material government witness re-
canted his entire testimony. The witness subsequently repudiated his recantation. The 
court refused to believe that the trial testimony was false and consequently denied the 
motion. But see United States v. De Sapio, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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(b) that without it, the jury might have reached 
a different conclusion, 
(c) that the party seeking the new trial was 
taken by surprise when the false testimony was 
given and was unable to meet it or did not know 
of its falsity until after the trial.28 
The Larrison COUlt rejected the Berry requirement that mo-
tions for new trial be denied when the evidence is merely cumu-
lative, or only SUPpOlts the same points raised at trial.2'1 The 
Larrison standard differs from the Berry standard in that the 
Larrison standard requires the district judge to determine 
whether the jury might have reached a different conclusion if it 
had not heard the false testimony. 28 The Berry standard, on the 
other hand, requires the district judge to determine whether the 
jury would probably reach a different conclusion, if the jury 
heard the new testimony.29 The essential differences between the 
two standards are: (1) the degree of certainty which the trial 
judge must attach to the likelihood of a different verdict from 
the jury; that is, that the jury might or would probably reach a 
different verdict; and, (2) the· knowledge of the evidence which 
the judge must impute to the jury. That is, under Larrison, the 
judge does not impute knowledge of the false testimony, while 
under Berry, the judge does impute knowledge of the testimony 
and the knowledge that the prior testimony was perjured.so 
26. [d. at 87-88. The Seventh Circuit subsequently limited the scope of the Larrison 
standard in United States Y. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other 
grounds, 327 U.S. 106 (1946), to apply in cases in which the testimony was proven false 
or recanted. A majority of the circuit courts today apply the Larrison standard as modi-
fied by Johnson. See United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976) (recantation of 
testimony by a material government witness); United States·v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (perjured testimony by a material government witness); United States v. Bri-
ola, 465 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); United States v. 
Smith, 433 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970) (recantation not believed); Newman v. United 
States, 238 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956) (recantation of testimony); Gordon v. United States, 
178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1949) (recantation of testimony), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950). 
27. 24 F.2d at 87. 
28. [d. 
29. 10 Ga. at 527. 
30. Several courts have noted a third difference between the two standards. See, 
e.g., United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 
327 U.S. 106 (1946). The Larrison standard refers to the original trial jury, while the 
Berry standard refers to the future jury at the new trial. Both the Larrison and Berry 
standards require the district judge to evaluate the impact of the new evidence on the 
jury's verdict. Whether the judge considers the original or a future jury is of no practical 
significance. The judge can only evaluate the hypothetical outcome by integrating his or 
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These differences have only recently been addressed by the fed-
eral courts. SI Two trends have emerged-one limiting, and the 
other expanding, the scope of the Larrison standard. 
Several courts have criticized the Larrison standard in re-
cent years.S2 In United States v. Stofsky,SS the Second Circuit 
rejected the Larrison standard in favor of the Berry standard. 
The Stofsky court noted that the Larrison standard is too 
"seculative,"s, and if literally applied, would always result in a 
new trial.slS The Stofsky court, however, limited its holding to 
cases in which defendants do not allege government culpability 
or knowledge in the use of the false testimony.S6 Noting previous 
uncertainty regarding the application of the Berry standard, the 
her observations of the original jury. The Ninth Circuit similarly took this position in 
Krasny. 
31. See notes 32 & 38 infra. 
32. The Larrison standard has been criticized as lacking sufficient precedent. See 
Note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 316 (1955). The courts have expressed their disfavor with the 
Larrison standard by limiting the scope of the standard. This has been done in a number 
of ways. Some courts apply the standard only in cases in which the government has 
knowingly or negligently used the false testimony. E.g., United States v. Curran, 465 
F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1972). Other courts apply the standard only in cases in which the 
testimony relates to an essential element of the crime. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 528 
F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976). One court has held that the Larrison standard should be ap-
plied only when the motion for new trial,is brought within seven days of the final judg-
ment. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 991 (1975). 
33. 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert: denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). In Sto/sky, a 
factually interesting case, a leading government witness, defendant's accomplice, lied at 
trial to avoid revealing the source of personal assets subject to tax liability. The govern-
ment was excused from culpability for negligent use of the perjured testimony because 
the witness had transactional immunity, and it was not foreseeable by the government 
that the witness would lie under the circumstances. The court denied the motion because 
the new evidence was not exculpatory, and could have supported defendant's conviction. 
34. [d. at 245. The court referred to the Larrison standard as too speculative, with-
out explaining what this criticism meant. This commentator believes that the Stofsky 
court meant that the standard allows district judges to exercise excessive discretion in 
ruling upon motions for new trial. 
35. [d. at 245-46 ("[TJhe test, if literally applied, should require reversal in cases of 
perjury with respect to even minor matters, especially in light of the standard jury in-
struction that upon finding that a witness had deliberately proferred false testimony in 
part, the jury may disregard his entire testimony."). 
36. [d. at 243. The court cited two lines of cases in which the Berry standard has 
been modified in favor of the lesser Larrison standard: (I) government culpability in the 
suppression of evidence cases, and (2) perjured testimony cases. The Sto/sky court re-
jected the modification for perjured testimony cases but not government suppression 
cases. The court did not state the basis for this distinction. Nor did the court state in 
which category it would consider cases involving government culpability or negligence in 
the use of perjured testimony by a government witness. 
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court clarified the proper procedure. The district judge is to ap-
praise the factual impact of the new testimony on the jury's de-
termination as well as the impeaching aspects of the tesimony.37 
The Larrison standard does not permit the judge to consider the 
impact of the new testimony on the credibility of the witness. 
Other courts have expanded the scope of the Larrison stan-
dard.3s Most recently, in United States v. Willis,39 a Penn-
sylvania district court modified the Larrison standard to its 
most liberal version yet. The Willis court changed the element 
of the Larrison standa.rd that requires the judge to appraise the 
impact on the jury's verdict as if it had not heard the false testi-
mony."o Under Willis, the judge must appraise the impact of the 
new testimony on the jury's verdict as well as the effect of the 
new testimony on the credibility of the witness. 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS: ADOPTION OF THE Berry Standard 
Because the case was one of first impression,"1 the Krasny 
court reviewed the other circuits' standards for motions for new 
trials based on perjUlced testimony. Following the Second Cir-
37. Id. at 246. The Second Circuit stated that this aspect of the Berry standard has 
not been the subject of "explicit judicial reported consideration." Id. However, this as-
pect is addressed by the Berry standard itself. The last element of the standard provides 
that a "new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the 
character or credit of a witness." 10 Ga. at 527 (emphasis added). A fortiori, because the 
standard states that the evidence may not be used for impeachment, the Berry court 
obviously contemplated that the new evidence could be used for impeachment. 
38. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278 (4th Cir. 1973) (district court 
could properly look at all circumstances surrounding a recantation when ruling upon 
motions for new trial based on perjured testimony); United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D. 
157 (D.N.J. 1962) (the function of the trial judge is not to decide what the verdict should 
finally be, but rather to determine whether the newly discovered evidence should be sub-
mitted to the jury). 
39. 467 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1978), vacated and indictment dismissed on re-
quest of U.S. Attorney's Office, 606 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1979) (a government agent falsified 
a surveillance report and gave perjured testimony regarding the report at trial). 
40. "That without it, the jury might have reached a different conclusion." 24 F.2d at 
87. The Willis court noted that this change was made in light of the jury instruction to 
the effect that upon finding that a witness testified falsely in part, it may choose to 
disregard his or her entire testimony. It should be noted that the Willis holding may be 
limited to cases involving government culpability because the witness was a government 
agent. 
41. The court distinguished two prior Ninth Circuit cases as involving different legal 
issues: Mejia v. United States, 291 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant recanted confes-
sion of guilt), and Strangway v. United States, 312 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 
U.S. 903 (1963) (testimony of the witness was held not be perjured, even though it was 
inconsistent with her tax returns and established a basis for a perjury prosecution). 
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cuit's decision in United States v. Stofsky,42 the court adopted 
the Berry standard, rejecting the application of the Larrison 
standard in cases involving perjured or recanted testimony if the 
government did not knowingly or negligently use the false 
testimony.4s 
The Krasny court based its criticism of the Larrison stan-
dard on the reasoning in Stofsky. The· court argued that the 
Larrison standard is speculative,44 and that applying the Lar-
rison standard would necessarily require a new trial .... Uncon-
vinced that all cases involving perjured testimony require new 
trials, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Larrison standard.46 The 
court also disapproved of those cases in which courts have ap-
plied both the Larrison and Berry standards"7 
The Krasny court stated that it saw no reason to distin-
guish perjured or recanted testimony from other types of newly 
discovered evidence!S The court stated that "[t]he focus of the 
inquiry [should be] on what difference the evidence would have 
made to the trial regardless of its source. "49 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Krasny from several other 
types of cases involving perjured testimony. The court first dis-
tinguished Krasny from cases in which defendants alleged gov-
ernment culpability or negligence,l5o although the court cited no 
basis for this distinction. The Krasny court next distinguished 
the Supreme Court case of Mesarosh v. United States,151 an in-
42. 527 F.2d 237 (2nd Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See notes 33-35 
supra and accompanying text. 
43. 607 F.2d at 844-45. 
44. See note 34 supra. 
45. See note 35 supra. 
46. 607 F.2d at 844. 
47. ld. at 843 (citing United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977»; 
United States V. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973). See also United States V. Jackson, 
579 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United States V. Mackin, 561 
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977). 
48. 607 F.2d at 844. 
49.ld. 
50 .. ld. at 844-45. In Krasny, no allegation of government knowledge or negligent use 
was made, because the government "with commendable candor" advised the defendant's 
attorney of the possible perjury by its witness, only six months after the final judgment 
(well within the two year limit for new trial motions based upon newly discovered evi-
dence). ld. at 842. 
51. 352 U.S. 1 (1956). Compare Mesarosh with Communist Party of the United 
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veterate perjurer case. In Mesarosh, the Supreme Court held 
that a conviction based on perjured testimony required a new 
trial.II2 The Krasny court distinguished Mesarosh on the ground 
that the motion for new trial was not a rule 33 motion, but 
rather a motion by the Solicitor General.lls 
The Dissent 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ely rejected the majority's 
adoption of the stricter Berry standard, arguing that Mesarosh 
required the application of the more liberal "time-honored"" 
Larrison standard. Quoting Chief Justice Warren: 
[The chief prosecution witness], by his [tainted] 
testimony, has poisoned the water in the reser-
voir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without 
first draining it of all impurity. . . . [The court 
must] see that the waters of justice are not pol-
luted. Pollution having taken place here, the con-
dition should be remedied at the earliest possible 
opportunity. nil 
Judge Ely stated that in light of the witness' perjury, the jury 
might well have belioved the defendant's defense of duress and 
acquitted the defendant. Judge Ely thus concluded that the con-
viction should have been vacated and the case remanded for new 
trial.lI11 
D. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Krasny typifies an emergent 
trend by a growing minority of the circuits which reject the Lar-
rison standard.II'l The Krasny court's criticism of the Larrison 
standard is well takEm. The Larrison standard has been viewed 
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956). These cases involved 
testimony by a material government Witness which was entirely discredited by previous 
trial perjury involving similnr matters. 
52. In Mesarosh, the false testimony was presented by a paid informer in the em-
ploy of the government. 
53. Mesarosh can be distinguished from Krasny on other grounds: (1) the witness in 
Krasny was not a paid government informer, but rather an accomplice; (2) the testimony 
of the witness was discredited only in part, and did not directly relate to the defendant's 
conduct. 
54. 607 F,2d at 846-47. 
55. [d. at 847 (quoting Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. at 14). 
56. 607 F.2d at 847. 
57. See note 32 supra. 
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as being the more liberal standard for motions for new trial, but 
its practical effect is just the reverse. Although the Krasny court 
argued that a literal application of the Larrison standard would 
necessarily result in a new trial, ISS application of the Larrison 
standard results in fewer successful motions for new trial. 
Motions for new trial based on perjured or recanted testi-
mony are seldom granted, regardless of the standard employed.lSs 
Orders denying motions for new trial based on the Larrison 
standard are less likely to be reversed on appeal, however, than 
those based on the Berry standard. Appellate courts may review 
district judges' orders only for an abuse of discretion in applying 
the proper standard. Appellate courts rarely decide whether the 
district judge has abused his or . her discretion in circuits apply-
ing the Larrison standard. Appellate courts are precluded from 
making this decision by two factors: (1) the failure of district 
judges to state explicit factual determinations for their decisions 
on motions for new trials; and, (2) the nonappealable element of 
the Larrison standard requiring proof of the false testimony 
before application of the other elements.6o Because district 
judges rarely state the factual basis for their determinations on 
motions for new trial, reversal is unlikely unless a blatant error 
has been made. Nearly every motion for new trial is denied in 
circuit courts that apply the Larrison standard because the trial 
testimony is found not perjured or the recantation of the testi-
mony is not believed.61 A finding that the testimony was not 
perjured is not reviewable unless wholly unsupported by the evi-
dence.62 Thus, the Larrison standard effectively enables a dis-
58. See note 34 & 35 supra. 
59. Only six motions for new trial based on perjured testimony have been successful: 
United States v. Willis, 467 F. Supp. 1111 (D.C. Pa.), vacated and indictment dismissed 
on request of u.S. Attorney's Office, 606 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1979), and see note 39 supra 
and acccompanying text; United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976), and see 
note 38 supra; United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying both Berry 
and Larrison standards); Newsome v. United States, 311 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1962) (apply-
ing a hybrid Berry-Larrison standard requiring new trial if the new testimony raised a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt); United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D. 157 
(D.N.J. 1962) (Larrison standard applied); Pettine v. New Mexico, 201 F. 489 (8th Cir. 
1912). 
60. See note 26 supra. 
61. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970); Newman v. 
United States, 238 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956). Even Larrison turned on this issue. See note 
25 supra. 
62. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946). 
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trict judge to deny motions for new trial with little chance of 
appellate reversal. 
The Krasny cowt properly rejected the Larrison standard, 
but for unpersuasive reasons. The court cited Stofsky's reason-
ing that the standard is too speculative, but failed to explain 
what this criticism means.6S 
The Krasny COUlt'S rejection of the Larrison standard only 
in cases in which gov·ernment culpability or negJ4gence is not al-
leged is inconsistent with the court's criticisms of the Larrison 
standard. Following the reasoning in Krasny to its logical ex-
treme, all cases alleging government culpability or negligence 
would necessarily require new trials. This dictum indicates a de-
parture from prior Ninth Circuit cases involving government 
culpability.64 
The Ninth Circuit failed to state the reason for distinguish-
ing between perjured testimony cases which allege government 
culpability from other perjured testimony cases. The effect of 
the perjured testimolny on the accused is the same regardless of 
government knowledge of the false testimony. Nor did the Ninth 
Circuit state why it preferred the Berry standard over the Lar-
rison standard, except that it saw no difference between per-
jured testimony and other types of newly discovered evidence.611 
The Berry standard does not present the problems on ap-
peal that the Larrison standard presents. It is a workable stan-
dard capable of iIl.dividual application in factually varying 
cases.66 The Berry standard, however, is similar to the Larrison 
standard in that district judges frequently fail to apply the ele-
ments of the standard to the facts of the case.67 The factual de-
terminations of district judges are usually mere conclusionary 
statements. The Krasny court correctly remanded the case to 
the district judge fo!' an explicit factual determination of the ba-
63. See note 34 supra. 
64. See United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Chisum, 436 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1971). 
65. 607 F.2d at 844. 
66. See note 24 supra for a variety of fact situations in which the Berry standard 
has been applied. 
67. See note 6 supra. r£he lower court opinion in Krasny is typical of the way dis-
trict judges have ruled upon motions for new trial. 
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sis for the denial of the motion for new trial.68 The Ninth Circuit 
also gave recommendations to the district court relating to the 
issues to be considered by the district judge.69 This will be help-
ful to district judges in future perjured or recanted testimony 
cases. 
The dissenting opinion supporting the Larrison standard 
was as unpersuasive as the majority opinion. Judge Ely incor-
rectly relied on the reasoning of Mesarosh as support for the 
Larrison standard, ignoring the practical results of the standard 
which indicate that Larrison is not the more liberal standard. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit was correct in adopting a more workable 
standard than the Larrison standard. The reasoning supporting 
the decision in Krasny, however, was weak. The court did not 
explain why the Berry standard was superior to the Larrison 
standard, nor did it clarify the difference between Krasny and 
other cases involving perjured testimony which allege govern-
ment culpability. 
The Krasny decision will have the practical effect of al-
lowing the defendant to choose which standard he or she desires 
to be applied. If the perjured testimony can be readily shown, 
the defendant will allege government misconduct-thereby ob-
taining a greater chance of success on the motion with the appli-
cation of the Larrison standard. If, however, the perjured testi-
mony cannot be readily shown, the defendant will stand a 
greater chance of success if he or she fails to allege government 
misconduct with the application of the Berry standard. When 
this happens, the Ninth Circuit will have to address this dichot-
68. 607 F.2d at 846. 
69. [The district court] will need to consider, among other things, 
the importance of [the witness'] testimony to the govern-
ment's case, the extent to which the apparently perjured testi-
mony concerned material issues in the case, and the extent to 
which her credibility, as a whole would be affected by the 
relevation to the jury of this apparent perjury. 
ld. 
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omy and the substantive differences between these types of 
cases. 
Jill A. Schwendinger* 
IV. NO EXTENSION OF JENCKS ACT TO SUPPRESSION 
HEARING OR SURVEILLANCE NOTES, BUT EX-
PANDED BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Bernard! the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Jencks ActS does not apply to pre-trial suppression hearings 
* Second Year Student, Loyola University School of Law. 
1. 623 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Kilkenny, J. and ¥derson, J., revising, 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 
1979». 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) provides: 
Demands for production of statements and reports of 
witnesses 
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United 
States, no statement or report in the possession of the United 
States which was made by a Government witness or prospec-
tive Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be 
the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said 
witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the 
case. 
(b) After Ii witness called by the United States has testi-
fied on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the 
defendant, order the United States to produce any statement 
(as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the 
United States which relates to the subject matter as to which 
the witness baa testified. H the entire contents of any such 
statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the 
witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the 
defendant for his exanlination and use. 
(d) H the United States elects not to comply with an or-
der of the court under subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to 
the defendant any such statement, or such portion thereof as 
the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the 
testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the 
court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of jus-
tice require thnt a mistrial be declared. 
(e) The term "statement", as used in subsections (b), 
(c), and (d) of this section in relation to any witness called by 
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and that probable cause may be based on the collective knowl-
edge of officers working in close concert. The court revised its 
prior position that the Jencks Act requires exclusion of a govern-
ment agent's trial testimony because the agent destroyed rough 
surveillance notes after he wrote a final report. 
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) learned through an 
informant that defendant Bernard and two others would be 
purchasing chemicals to manufacture methamphetamine. This 
information was supported by Bernard's subsequent purchases 
of chemicals on four occasions. 
DEA agents, on the day of the arrest, followed one of the 
defendants to a camper in a mobile home park where the defen-
dant met with other people who were in separate vehicles. The 
agents then followed the vehicles to a state park. The camper 
parked while the other vehicles criss-crossed the park in an anti-
surveillance move. From the air, agents observed boxes being 
moved into the camper. 
A DEA agent testified that he saw two people leave the 
camper and drive away from the state park. About ten minutes 
later they returned and the agents overheard them report to the 
others in the camper that the park was staked out. The agent 
testified that he thought he smelled something "cooking," but 
didn't make the connection between the smell and the 
methamphetamine. About the same time, the agent observed a 
person rush out of the camper "gasping, breathing deep" and 
"shaking his head,"a in what the agent thought was an attempt 
to get fresh air. 
About ten mintues later, the agent reported these observa-
the United States, means -
(1) a written statement made by said witness and 
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; 
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substan-
tially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by 
said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the 
making of such oral statement; or 
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a 
transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a 
grand jury. 
3. 623 F.2d at 554. 
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tions to another agent. The agents concluded the camper was 
being used to manufacture drugs. The principal investigating 
agent arrived about aJrl hour later. He was told about the obser-
vations made during the day including the conclusion that the 
camper was being used to manufacture drugs, but not about the 
choking incident, the smell, or the conversation about the park 
being staked out. Based on that information and information 
from a prior investigation, the principal agent ordered a war-
rantless arrest. A subsequent search of the camper produced evi-
dence of drugs. 
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence as fruits of an 
arrest unsupported by probable cause. The district court ruled 
that under the Jenck£1 Act, the DEA agent's testimony regarding 
the choking incident, the overheard conversation, and the smell 
had to be stricken both at the suppression hearing and at trial 
because rough surveillance notes had been destroyed after the 
final report was made. Without the agent's testimony, there was 
insufficient information for probable cause." 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding (1) that the agent's tes-
timony was admissable at the pre-trial suppression hearing be-
cause the Jencks Act applies only to the trial; (2) that rough 
surveillance notes are distinguishable from rough interview notes 
and are not required. for production under the Jencks Act; (3) 
that probable cause need not rest solely on the arresting officer's 
personal knowledge; and (4) that the "collective knowledge" of 
all the officers was Bufficient to constitute probable cause and 
need not have been ·communicated. 
The court focusE~d on two major issues: (1) the scope of the 
Jencks Act both as to its application to the pre-trial suppression 
hearing and as to the meaning of "statements" under the Act; 
and (2) "collective knowledge" as a basis for probable cause. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Jencks Act 
The Jencks Act regulates the production of prior witness 
statements in the goyernment's possession during a federal crim-
4. [d. at 560. 
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inal prosecution. The Act was passed in reaction to Jencks v. 
United States,1$ which held that a defendant is entitled to state-
ments within the government's possession if the defendant's re-
quest was for fairly specific statements made by the witness. 
Congress narrowed the scope of the Jencks decision through a 
time requirementS and a rigorous definition of "statements.''7 
The Act provides tliat at trial after a witness' direct testi-
mony, the defendant may demand production of the witness' 
prior statements and reports if they are material to the witness' 
testimony. If the government claims all or part' of the statement 
is immaterial to the witness' testimony, the court may either or-
der production, or grant the government an in camera inspec-
tion. The court may excise the immaterial portions and order 
the rest delivered to the defendant. If the defendant objects to 
the withholding of the statements, the court may order the ex-
cised portion preserved for appeal. If the government "elects not 
to comply"8 with the court order, the court may apply sanctions 
against the government either by striking the witness' testi-
mony, or by declaring a mistrial. Sanctions have been applied 
when the government has lost or destroyed statements, even if 
the loss or destruction was in good faith or negligent.9 
Only certain staements are producible under the. Jencks 
Act. The Supreme Court has held that the producible state-
ments are limited to those listed in the Act.10 Under the Jencks 
Act a "statement" is: (1) a written statement "signed or other-
wise adopted or approved" by the witness,11 (2) a recording 
"which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement 
made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously,"12 or (3) 
a statement made by the witness to a grand jury.18 
5. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
6. 18 U.S.C. § 35OO(a) (1976). 
7. ld. § 35OO(e). 
8. ld. § 35OO(d). 
9. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harrison, 
524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
10. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (1) (1976). 
12. ld. § 3500(e)(2). 
13. ld. § 3500(e)(3). 
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Collective Knowledge Probable Cause 
"Collective knowledge" probable cause, or "the fellow officer 
rule," allows an arrest to be valid even though the arresting of-
ficer did not personally acquire or is not personally possessed of 
all the underlying facul and circumstances amounting to proba-
ble cause. There seom to be two sources of "collective 
knowledge" probable cause: United States v. Romero,14 and 
Whiteley v. Warden. llI 
In Romero,16 the ICOurt held that officers working together 
could pool their knowledge to arrive at probable cause. The of-
ficers were working as a team and were allowed to rely upon 
each other's communi(:ated information. 
In Whiteley,I" the court stated in dicta that police may ar-
rest in reliance upon radio bulletins of valid warrants. The case 
has come to stand for allowing arrests to be made without com-
munication of the underlying facts and circumstances constitut-
ing probable cause if the arrest is made under a directive or 
request. 
14. 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957). 
15. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
16. In Romero, several officers were working together on the investigation. One of-
ficer met with the defendant to arrange for the sale of cocaine while two officers observed 
from a building across the street. All the officers met at another officer's car parked down 
the street when the bag of cocaine was delivered in exchange for marked currency. The 
officers conducted a field test to see if the bag contained an opium derivative. It did. 
FoUr of the defendants were arrested immediately. Two others were arrested after fur-
ther observation. The court held that "where the agents were working together and in 
cooperation were observing the activities of the various participants and informing each 
other of the progress of the conspiracy, the knowledge of each was the knowledge of all." 
249 F.2d at 374. 
17. In Whiteley, the Sheriff of Carbon County, Wyoming received a tip about 
Whiteley and Dailey and a breaking and entering crime. The Sheriff signed a compulsory 
complaint upon which a justice of the peace issued a warrant. The warrant was then 
broadcast across the state along with a description of the two men and their car. A po-
liceman in Laramie heard the broadcast and arrested the two described persons. The 
court concluded that the arrest warrant was invalid because it was based on a 
conclusionary complaint, and that there was an insuffiCient showing that the Sheriff or 
the Laramie police had enough information to reasonably believe the defendants were 
connected with the crime. 
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C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Jencks Act and the Pre-trial Suppression Hearing 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Jencks Act does not apply 
to suppression hearings because the Act limits production of 
statements and reports to when the witness has testified on di-
rect examination in "the trial of the case. "18 The court also held 
that "trial of the case" means the actual trial and noted that 
other circuits are in accord.l9 The court rejected the defendants' 
argument that Congress would have considered the pre-trial 
suppression hearing to be a trial or an integral part of the trial 
had they thought about it.20 The court stated it was not within 
its function "to engraft on a statute additions which we think 
the legislature logically might or should have made."21 
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that re-
stricting the operation of the Jencks Act to trial only subverts 
the decision of" Brady v. Maryland.22 In Brady, the Supreme 
Court held that the refusal of the prosecution to hand over evi-
dence which might exonerate the defendant or lessen his punish-
ment was a denial of due process. Brady applies only to certain 
types of evidence: that which goes to guilt or innocence, or to 
punishment. The Bernard court reasoned that Brady is an inde-
pendent foundation for the production of documents and was 
not meant to overrule the Jencks Act. The court stated that 
Brady may apply to some pre-trial hearings;28 but not to the 
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976). 
19. 623 F.2d at 556 n.15 (citing United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 
1974); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 
(1970». . 
20. Defendants relied upon the dissent in United States v. Spagnuolo, 515 F.2d 818 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
21. 623 F.2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 
(1941). 
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the defendant admitted at trial that he partici-
pated in the robbery charged, but claimed his companion committed the murder. He 
sought a verdict without capital punishment. Brady and his companion, in separate 
trials, were both found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Prior to 
trial, Brady's counsel asked the prosecution to see the companion's extrajudicial state-
ments. The prosecution offered some statements but withheld one where the companion 
confessed doing the actual killing. This statement did not surface until Brady had been 
tried, convicted, sentenced, and his conviction affirmed. The court held that Brady was 
denied due process by the prosecution's withholding of the confession and that he was 
entitled to a new trial on the issue of punishment. 
23. 623 F.2d at 557 n.19. 
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pre-trial suppression hE~arings because such hearings focus on 
the issue of probable cause, not on guilt or punishment.24 
Rough Surveillance Notes as Jencks Act Statements 
In its original opillion,25 the court held that surveillance 
notes were potentially lproducible statements under the Jencks 
Act, but in the revised opinion, the court held that surveillance 
notes were not statemellts and no sanctions need be applied for 
their destruction. The court felt that the Harris-Robinson28 rule, 
which holds that the destruction of rough interview notes 
amounts to a usurpation of judicial discretion in determining 
which statements need to be produced, should not be extended 
to rough surveillance notes. The court decided that it would be 
too broad a reading of the Jencks Act to say that surveillance 
notes were "adopted or approved"2'1 by the witness or "substan-
tially verbatim recordillgs."28 
In distinguishing hetween the two kinds of notes, the court 
found that rough interview notes tend to be factual only and are 
completed during the interview, while surveillance notes tend to 
be impressionistic and conclusionary as well as "sketchy and in-
complete" and may not have been written contemporaneously.29 
The court agreed with the government's argument that "[s]uch 
cursory notes can not accurately be described as being 'adopted 
or approved' by the agent since they are incomplete and not in 
context. "80 
The court also held that there were policy reasons for not 
allowing surveillance ]tlotes to be Jencks Act statements. The 
court looked to the legislative history of the Jencks Act as de-
tailed in Palermo v. United States.81 The Supreme Court stated 
24. Id. at 556-57 (citing McCray v. Dlinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967». 
25. 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979). 
26. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Robin-
son, 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976). 
27. 623 F.2d at 557-58 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 35OO(e)(I) (1976». 
28. Id. (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (2) (1976». 
29. 623 F.2d at 557-58. 
30. Id. at 557. 
31. 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 1'he day after the Jencks decision, the House of Represent-
atives was told by the Attorney General that the decision posed serious national security 
problems and that legislation should be introduced. On the same day the first of eleven 
bills dealing with the problem was introduced. The Jencks Act was passed three months 
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that one of the prime motivating forces behind passage of the 
Act was a fear that an expansive reading of the recent decision 
in Jencks v. United States32 would result in the disclosure of 
"the investigative agent's interpretations and impressions. "33 
The court reasoned that the disclosure of the statements would 
be harmful to the national interest because the "inner workings 
of the investigative process"34 would be revealed. The state-
ments would also be used unfairly against the agent for im-
peachment. The Bernard court reasoned that surveillance notes 
were the type of interpretive and impressionary memoranda that 
Congress intended to protect from discovery.35 
Collective Knowledge Probable Cause 
Although the court found that the arresting officer did not 
have sufficient specific knowledge for probable cause, the court 
reasoned that there was sufficient "collective knowledge" among 
the agents to constitute probable cause. The court found that 
the decision to arrest was, in effect, a joint decision. The arrest-
ing officer had "relied 'to a great degree' "36 on the opinion of 
the other agents and it was not necessary that the substance of 
the information be communicated to him. 
To support this position, the court cited Whiteley v. War-
den.37 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the DEA agent acted 
like the officer who acts on a police bulletin. In both cases prob-
able cause is based on a lack of specific knowledge, reliance on 
uncommunicated observations and knowledge of. other officers. 
D. CRITIQUE 
The Jencks Act and the Pre-trial Suppression Hearing 
The holding of the Ninth Circuit to not compel production 
of Jencks Act statements at the suppression hearing is in accord 
later. Congress was concerned that the Jencks decision not be interpreted to allow fish-
ing expeditions by defendants through government files, that the statements should not 
be given to the defendant until the witness had testified, and that the Jencks Act should 
not be used as a discovery device. 
32. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
33. 360 U.S. at 350. 
34.Id. 
35. 623 F.2d at 558. 
36. Id. at 560. 
37. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
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with current judicial thought. There is, however, some dicta sug-
gesting that a judge should be allowed discretion in compelling 
production of Jencks Act statements at pre-trial hearings under 
certain circumstances.sa The majority of cases have limited pro-
duction to the actual tlrial.S9 This limitation is based upon: (1) 
the statutory language limiting production until "after the wit-
ness 'has testified on direct examination in the trial of the 
case";40 (2) legislative history where Congress expressed a con-
cern about pre-trial disclosure of government files;41 and (3) case 
law interpreting the statutory language to mean the actual 
trial.42 
The construction of the statutory lapguage "trial of the 
case" to mean the actual trial, follows from the designation of 
certain proceedings as "pre-trial,"4s and therefore, not the trial. 
Case law supports this strict construction of "trial. "44 The sup-
pression hearing is generally considered to be pre-trial. 
Congressional intent has also been generally interpreted to 
mean the actual trial, but language in the legislative history is 
ambiguous. "[I]t is tho specific intent of the bill to provide for 
the production of statements, reports, transcriptions or record-
38. United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 879 (1969) 
(affirming denial of disclosure at pre-trial suppression hearing as a function of judicial 
discretion rather than as a matter of law); United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 
(D.C. Mich. 1976) (due to complexity of the case and the number of witnesses, strict 
adherence to schedule'imposed by Jencks Act for disclosure would unreasonably delay 
the trial; therefore, disclosure was compelled pre-trial). 
39. In the following cases production was denied at pre-trial hearings: United States 
v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.) (suppression hearing), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 955 
(1978); United States v. Spanguola, 515 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975) (suppression hearing); 
United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1974) (suppression hearing); United 
States v. Polesti, 489 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1973) (suppression hearing), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 990 (1975); Robbins v. United· States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973) (preliminary 
hearing); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.) (suppression hearing), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970). 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976). 
41. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1861, 1861. 
42. United States V. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States V. 
Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970). 
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) (2), for example, provides that: "Defenses and objections 
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information 
other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be 
raised only by motion before trial." (Emphasis added.) 
44. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
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ings, as described in the bill after the Government witness has 
testified against the defendant on direct examination in open 
court, and to prevent disclosure before such witness has testi-
fied. "45 This language leaves open the possibility that "trial of 
the case" could be interpreted as the "court proceedings of the 
case" which would include the suppression hearing. Other trial 
rights have been accorded the criminal defendant at the sup-
pression hearing such as the right to counsel and the right to 
cross examination. 
Because the statements are not producible until the witness' 
cross examination, their primary use is for impeachment.46 This 
impeachment use is as relevant to the suppression hearing as to 
the actual trial. It has been argued that failure to require pro-
duction of the prior statements at the suppression hearing un-
duly interferes with the defendant's ability to cross-examine and 
impeach the government's witnesses.47 The government's inter-
ests in limiting disclosure to the trial only, fail to consider 
whether the defendant's rights will be fully protected. Further-
more, there may be no benefits gained by the government by 
limiting disclosure (such as speeding up the criminal justice sys-
tem)48 because: (1) suppression issues are rarely relitigated; (2) 
some of the witnesses who testify at the suppression hearing do 
not testify at the trial; and (3) there may be no trial at all be-
cause defendants often choose to plead guilty once evidence is 
found admissible against them.48 
Under Brady v. Maryland,5o the defense is entitled to state-
ments in the government's possession which go to the defen-
dant's guilt or punishment. The use of such statements is prima-
rily for substantive use. The· Ninth Circuit has required a 
showing of prejudice before allowing Brady to override the 
Jencks Act.51 This strict application of the Jencks Act is logical 
given Congress' statement that "[t]he purpose of this proposed 
45. s. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Seas. 1, 2, reprinted in [1957] 2 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1861, 1863 (emphasis added). 
46. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, '349 (1959). 
47. Onley, Expanding Defendant's Discovery: The Jencks Act at Pretrial Hearings, 
24 BUFFALO L. REv. 419, 428-29 (1975). 
48. Id. at 427. 
49. Id. at 429. 
50. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
51. Thomas v. Cardwell, 626 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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legislation is. . . to provide for the exclusive procedure for han-
dling demands for the production of statements and reports of 
witnesses. "G2 The exclusivity of the Jencks Act was affirmed in 
Palermo v. United States.GS 
A change in poli(!y is desirable, but unlikely to come 
through the judiciary. The Supreme Court set the tone for 
Jencks Act interpretation: 
In almost eve~J enactment there are gaps to be 
filled in and ambiguities to be resolved by judicial 
construction. This statute is not free from them. 
Here, however, the detailed particularity with 
which Congress has spoken has narrowed the 
scope for needful interpretation to an unusual de-
gree. The statute clearly defines procedure and 
plainly indicates the circumstances for their 
application. M 
The courts of appeals, following the Supreme Court's lead, have 
strictly construed the Act. 
The Second Circuit has both criticized the Jencks Act pro-
duction limitationGG and encouraged voluntary cooperationG6 by 
the government in the same cases where it has strictly construed 
the Act. Change will, therefore, come from Congress, and not the 
judiciary. 
Rough Surveillance Notes as Jencks Act Statements 
On the basis that Jencks Act statements are primarily use-
ful for impeachment, the Ninth,G'7 D.C.,GS and ThirdG9 Circuits 
have required the preservation of rough interview notes in addi-
52. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. I, 4, reprinted in [1957) 2 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1861, 1861 (emphasis added). 
53. 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 
54. Palermo V. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959). 
55. United States V. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1970). The court stated 
it might prefer, as a matter of policy, to uphold production at the suppression hearing, 
but believed it could not ignore the weight of authority to the contrary. 
56. United States V. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1974). The court en-
couraged Jencks Act problems to be worked out in pre-trial conferences, but held state-
ment need not have been produced at the pre-trial hearing. 
57. United States V. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976); United States V. Harris, 
543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976). 
58. United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
59. United States V. Vella, 562 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1977). 
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tion to the final interview report. These Circuits have held that 
the routine destruction of such notes denies the court the oppor-
tunity to review the material and to decide whether or not they 
are statements to be compelled for production, that it is a 
Jencks Act violation not to produce them, and that sanctions 
may be imposed for failure to produce.60 
The impeachment use of rough notes is based upon the pos-
sibility "that the agent who adopts a final report from prelimi-
nary memoranda will tailor his observations to fit his conclu-
sion."61 The possibility of distortion is also present in the 
making of a final report from rough surveillance notes. Indeed, 
distortion may be more likely to occur under those 
circumstances.62 
60. The following cases held that there is no Jencks Act violation if rough interview 
notes are destroyed in good faith: United States v. Martin, 565 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 
1978); United States v. An2alone, 555 F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 
(1977); United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 773 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Smaldone, 544 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1976); United States 
v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1292 (7th Cir. 1976); Hayes v. United States, 329 F.2d 209, 220 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964) (defendant must show notes are inconsistent 
with report); United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180, 202 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 383 U.S. 169 
(1964). 
61. 543 F.2d at 1251 (quoting United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2c1372, 377 (9th Cir. 
1976». 
62. The following quotation from Harrison seems applicable to rough surveillance 
notes: 
It is obvious, however, that even the most conscientious agent 
can err, despite careful training and despite his rechecking the 
the report against the notes before destroying the latter. 
Moreover there are certain factors peculiarly conducive to er-
ror where as in this case, the notes contain key identifying 
data provided by eyewitness. As we stated in Bundy [472 F.2d 
1266, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1972)]: 
["]The initial description of an assailant by the victim or other 
eyewitness is crucial evidence, and the notes taken of that 
description should be kept and produced. The formal written 
police report of the crime, does, of course, contain a descrip-
tion of the offender, but that report is often prepared after a 
suspect is arrested and the danger that the description in the 
formal report may be subconsciously influenced by the viewing 
of the suspect by the author of the report is very great.["] 
And certainly we cannot consider it beyond the bounds of pos-
sibility that a report be distorted because of ovenealousness 
on the part of the agent preparing • . . since preparation of 
the report and the decision whether or not to preserve the 
notes are entirely within the discretion of a single agent acting 
alone. 
524 F.2d at 429-30 (citation omitted). 
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The distinction malde by the Ninth Circuit between rough 
interview notes and rough surveillance notes is weak. The court 
based its distinction on the time and opportunity for recording 
as well as the content. Because this was a case of first impres-
sion, the court looked to other circuits, and found United States 
v. Lane,63 where the Tenth Circuit found surveillance notes not 
to be Jencks Act statements. This finding was based largely on 
the fact that the notes were not written contemporaneously with 
the observations and were rather sketchy. Although the Lane 
decision is not clear, tho court appears to have analyzed the sur-
veillance notes under 18 U.S.C. section 3500(e)(2), which re-
quires a recording to be a "substantially verbatim recital of an 
oral statement made by said witness and recorded contempora-
neously." This analysis is appropriate for interview notes, but 
not for surveillance notes which should be analyzed under 18 
U.S.C. section 3500(e)(l)'s "adopted or approved" standard. It is 
also worth noting that the Tenth Circuit does not recognize the 
need to apply sanction.8 for the destruction of rough interview 
notes.64 
The Ninth Circuit also looked to Palermo v. United 
States65 for a definitioll of "statement." The Palermo court dis-
cussed the cOIJ,gression.al intent to not permit disclosure of an 
agent's impression sUlIllmary. The Ninth Circuit appears to have 
recognized that rough interview notes may contain impression-
ary matter and the court is prepared to excise portion. The court 
seems to presume tha surveillance notes will consist entirely of 
impressionary material and, therefore, should not be required 
for production. This logic is weak. 
The Palermo Court also considered how statements should· 
be used if they "reflect fully and without distortion what was 
said to the government agent."66 This passage focuses on Con-
gress' emphasis on a "substantially verbatim recital" and "con-
tinuous narrative statoments"6'1 which reflects an analysis under 
63. 574 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1978); but see United States v. Deleon, 498 F.2d 1327 
(7th Cir. 1974) (surveillance notes found to be producible statements). 
64. United States v. Smaldone, 544 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
936 (1976). 
65. 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 
66. Id. at 352. 
67.Id. 
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18 U.S.C. section 3500(e)(2), which seems inappropriate for an 
analysis of surveillance notes. It is not clear why the Ninth Cir-
cuit cited this language. It appears that the court is requiring 
that a Jencks Act statement must meet both the "adopted and 
approved" and the "substantially verbatim recital" standards, 
even though the Act is clear that these standards apply to two 
different types of statements. 
In its original opinion, the Ninth Circuit analyzed surveil-
lance notes uner 18 U.S.C. section 3500(e)(I)'s "adopted or ap-
proved" standard and held that the surveillance notes were 
statements under the Jencks Act. The court reasoned that the 
notes are the agent's own words and he "adopts" them when he 
incorporates them into his final report.6S 
The court noted that it had given notice through its deci-
sions in United States v. Harris69 and United States v. Robin-
son'1O that the production of rough notes would be required. The 
court rejected the government's contention that application of 
the Harris-Robinson rule to surveillance notes would be retroac-
tive because those cases applied only to rough interview notes. 
"[T]here is nothing in either decision to indicate that the same 
rule would not be applicable to rough notes in surveillance oper-
ations."7l The reasoning in the original opinion seems much 
sounder than that of the revised opinion which held that surveil-
lance notes are never Jencks Act statements. " 
Collective Knowledge Probable Cause 
The Ninth Circuit has gone beyond either the Romero type 
of probable cause or the Whiteley type of probable cause. The 
arrest in Bernard was based neither on communicated know-
ledge nor on an order to arrest. 
The court resorted to "collective knowledge" because it ad-
68. 607 F.2d at 1264 ("We conclude that a government agent's truncated personal 
observation notes made at a surveillance site for incorporation in a later report falls 
within this statutory definition. The notes are the agent's own words. They are 
"adopted" by him in completing his report, and they constitute potentially discoverable 
material that the defendants might use for impeachment purposes if the agent later tes-
tifies at trial."). 
69. 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976). 
70. 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976). 
71. 607 F.2d at 1264. 
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mitted that the agent authorizing the arrest lacked probable 
cause.72 The court's finding that the decision to arrest was a col-
lective one seems to be stretching the facts of the case. The ar-
rest was not authorized until over an hour after the crucial ob-
servations were made. The principle investigating agent 
authorized the arrest largely upon conclusionary information. 
Probable cause should be founded on facts, not conclusions. 
For support of its finding that collective knowledge can jus-
tify an arrest, the court cited United States v. Stratton.73 In 
Stratton the court stated that the arresting officer himself need 
not possess all the available information, but could rely upon the 
collective knowledge of the investigative team. The court con-
cluded that "[t]he officers involved were working in close concert 
with each other and the knowledge of one of them was the 
knowledge of all." This language of the "knowledge of one officer 
is the knowledge of all" is found in many of the cases the court 
cited. It is originally from Romero v. United States.7• As used in 
the cases cited, the phrase was meant literally because the of-
ficers actually communicated their knowledge. Those courts held 
that the officers were Elntitled to rely upon that communicated 
information in determining probable cause.7 !> 
72. 623 F .2d at 558. 
73. 453 F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972). Secret service 
agents were working at the request of the United States Attorney's office who had in-
formed the agents that a warrant would be issued on November 27, 1970, the day of the 
arrest, but due to the unavailability of the magistrate over the weekend, the warrant was 
not issued until November 30th. The arrest then had to be analyzed as warrantless. This 
situation is analogous to that in Whiteley. 
74. 249 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1957). 
75. United States v. Caraballo, 571 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1978) (custom agents 
observed a boat carrying burlap bags thought to be marijuana, communicated this infor-
mation to other custom agents who continued the surveillance and eventually made ar-
rest); United States v. Rose, 541 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 
(1977) (sheriff conferred with prosecuting attorney about bank robbery to acquire 
enough facts for probable cause to arrest defendants); United States v. Heisman, 503 
F.2d 1284, 1290 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974) (secret service agents conducted surveillance of office 
where they had, pursuant to search warrant, found evidence of l,>rinting of counterfeit 
money including counterfeit money stored in a box with an apple on the top. When 
defendant went into the office and came out with the box with ~ apple on it, he was 
arrested. The arresting officer had not personally seen the box or its contents before, but 
the information had been communicated to him and he was entitled to rely upon it); 
Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
841 (1970) (customs agent had tip from informant that defendant was involved in smug-
gling. This agent and another, to whom the information had been communicated, fol-
lowed defendant, and eventually one of them arrested defendant at border patrol station 
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The Bernard court recognized that in at least some of the 
cases it cited, the substance of the information had been com-
municated to the other officers, but went on to state "[w]e do 
not find, however, that this is required, particularly where, as 
here, the agents were working in close concert."'16 The "close 
concert" language has been used in several prior cases, but, in 
those cases it was used only when the information was actually 
communicated or when the officers involved were acting under 
directives. The Ninth Circuit has extended the meaning of this 
language when it interprets it to not require communication. 
To strengthen its argument that the information need not 
be communicated, the court cited Whiteley v. Warden,'1'1 where 
in dictum the court said that police officers could base an arrest 
upon a radio bulletin that an arrest warrant had been issued. 
The Bernard panel analogized the reliance by officers upon a ra-
dio bulletin to the reliance of the principal investigating agent 
on the other DEA agents' statements. But the Bernard court did 
not decide whether the other :DEA agents' conclusions were 
based on probable cause. If not, then this situation is like that in 
Whiteley, where the court invalidated the arrest because the ar-
rest warrant bulletin was not based on probable cause.'18 
In his treatise on the fourth amendment,'19 Professor LaFave 
addressed the Bernard-type situation: 
The Whiteley type of case, in which there has 
been a directive or request from another officer or 
agency, must be distinguished from the situation 
while the other agent was parked close by and in continual radio contact) ("[K]nowledge 
in one sector of a police system can be availed of in another assuming some degree of 
communication."); Strassi v. United States, 410 F.2d 946, 952 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969) (cus-
toms agents were working together to break up drug ring. One agent followed courier 
from the border to a hotel where arrest took place. Actual arresting officer was working 
under the direction of the customs agent) (Whiteley situation): United States v. Pitt, 382 
F.2d 322, 324-25 (4th Cir. 1962) (police officer had a tip that the defendants were in-
volved in distributing drugs. He communicated information about the tip as well as de-
fendants' description to the officer who eventually arrested the defendant). 
76. 623 F.2d 551, 56!. 
77. 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971). Also cited was United States v. Gaither, 527 F.2d 456 
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976), where an arrest upon a radio bulletin 
of a warrant was held valid because the warrant was supported by probable cause. 
78. 401 U.S. at 568-69. 
79. 1 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 631 
(1978). 
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in which there has been no such directive or re-
quest but the arresting or searching officer at-
tempts to justify his action on the ground the of-
ficers were in possession of the underlying facts 
which would justify his action. 
The arrest in Bernard was not based upon a directive or request. 
Indeed, the arresting agent was the one who did the directing 
and requesting. It is illogical to suggest that his reliance on un-
communicated information is like that of officers upon a warrant 
bulletin. The directing or requesting approach of Whiteley was 
based on the assumption that the person or agency doing the 
directing or requesting had probable cause. The authorizing 
agent in Bernard did not have probable cause. 
The court has misused the "collective knowledge" concept. 
The concept was intended as a means of passing along personal 
knowledge or as a means of acting under the authority of those 
who are possessed of probable cause. As used in this case, "col-
lective knowledge" would allow an agency to make an arrest, and 
then, after the fact, gather information to, see if collectively 
there was enough knowledge for probable cause. Probable cause 
should be a safeguard ngainst unreasonable seizure, a determina-
tion made prior to the seizure, not an after-the-fact justification. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bernard has declined 
to grant the criminal defend!IDt any additional discovery rights 
under the Jencks Act while exposing the defendant to an ex-
panded basis for finding probable cause to arrest. 
Patricia A. Seitas* 
V. THE EFFECT OF A GUILTY PLEA UNDER FEDERAL 
FIREARMS LAVr 
In United States v. Benson, l the defendant was convicted 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 605 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wright; the other panel members were Tuttle, 
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for violating a federal statuteS prohibiting the receipt of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon. Benson, the defendant, did not dis-
pute that he had received a firearm,s but argued on appeal that 
he had never been convicted of a felony. 
Satisfaction of the prior conviction element of the offense 
was based on defendant's guilty plea in 1974 to a charge of vio-
lating an lllinois controlled substance statute· and his subse-
quent sentence to thirty months of probation. The record of the 
lllinois court did not indicate whether sentence was imposed 
persuant to a judgment of conviction or in accordance with an 
lllinois deferred prosecution statute. & The federal district court 
believed Benson was prosecuted under the deferred prosecution 
statute and that a judgment of conviction was never actually en-
tered on the record.6 Nevertheless, it held that, for purposes of 
federal law, Benson had been "convicted." 
On appeal the issue was whether Benson's prior "convic-
tion" was within the purview of the federal statute.? In affirming 
the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit held that federal 
law controls in the determination of "conviction" for purposes of 
this federal statute, and under federal law, a state court's ac-
ceptance of a guilty plea and a subsequent imposition of sen-
tence constitute a "conviction." The prior conviction element of 
D.J., sitting by designation, and Ely, J., concumng). 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1970) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in 
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year 
• • • to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
3. Benson, employed as a security guard, was required to carry a gun as part of his 
work uniform. He borrowed a gun from a co-worker and returned it to a locker each day 
at the end of his work shift. 605 F.2d at 1095 n.1. 
4. Illinois Controlled Substance Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56~, § 1402 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1979). 
5. Id. § 1410. See also, id. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(c). 
6. 605 F.2d at 1094 n.2. 
7. Benson had previously entered a "conditional guilty plea" in the district court, 
thereby reserving the right to appeal this issue. The Ninth Circuit held that conditional 
guilty pleas were not recognized in this circuit. The court of appeals, however, vacated 
Benson's conviction and allowed him to plead anew. 579 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978). See 
also, Note, Appellate Review of Non-Jurisdictional Constitutional Infirmities After a 
Plea of Guilty, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 235 (1979). 
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the offense was satisfied; whether Benson was considered a con-
victed felon under Illinois law was irrelevant. 
In a separate concurrence, Judge Ely explained that he felt 
bound by precedent in the Ninth Circuit to concur, but de-
nounced the result as a usurpation of the federal-state balance.s 
B. BACKGROUND 
Originally enacted as part of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,9 18 U.S.C. section 
922(h)(1) was signed into law as part of the Gun Control Act of 
1968.10 The statute was designed to keep firearms out of the 
hands of felons.u Although the statute explicitly defines a felon 
as a a person "who has been convicted in any court of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," the 
statute does not define the word "convicted."12 Courts have 
wrestled with the question of what constitutes a conviction for 
purposes of this statute,13 and the scant legislative history 
reveals little that is helpful in determining what meaning Con-
8. See notes 61-69 infra and accompanying text. 
9. Passed the Senate, May 24, 1968, 114 CONGo REC. 14889 (1968); passed the House 
of Representatives, June 6, 1968, 144 CONGo REc. 16300 (1968). The bill was passed by 
Congress on June 6, 1968, the day after the assassination of Robert Kennedy. Pub. L. 
No. 90-351 (1968). The assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther 
King have been seen as a strong force motivating the legislature to enact the measure. 
See Zimmring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 133 (1975). 
10. The Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, became effective October 22, 
1968, when signed into law by President Johnson. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1201-1203 (1976), a 
last minute floor amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, was 
enacted simultaneously with Title IV as part of the Gun Control Act. The provisions of 
the two titles are substantially the same. 
11. The Senate Report of the Judiciary Committee stated: 
The principal pw-poses of Title VII are to aid in making it 
possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally 
entitled to possesll them because of age, criminal background, 
or incompetency, and to assist law enforcement authorities in 
the states . • . iu combatting the increasing prevalence of 
crime in the United States. 
S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1968) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2112, 2113. 
12. The ambiguity makes the statute susceptible to different interpretations. One 
common definition of "conviction" is simply a finding of guilt based upon a plea or ver-
dict. Another definition requires the entry of a final judgment of conviction and sen-
tence. See Holland, Conviction Defined, 40 J. ST. B. CAL. 36 (1965). 
13. Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 
326 (1976). 
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tress intended the term to have. However, the provisions of the 
Act have been expansively applied by the courts persuant to the 
sweeping legislative goal of keeping firearms away from those 
with criminal backgrounds.14 
Generally, Congress intends its law to be uniformly inter-
pretted and applied, and unless Congress clearly indicates a con-
trary intention, the presumption is that federal law will be gov-
erned by a federal standard to achieve uniformity.15 However, 
where a federal law incorporates state law by reference the ques-
tion raised is which law Congress intended to control.16 Title IV 
is governed by 18 U.S.C. section 927, which indicates that Con-
gress intended the federal statute to be interpretted harmoni-
ously with state law, preempting state law only if there is a clear 
conflict.!'1 Because section 922(h)(l) is dependent upon the indi-
vidual states to define the predicate offense, prosecute the of-
fender, and determine a sentence, it has been asserted that the 
congressional intent was to leave the determination of the exis-
14. The Supreme Court has declared that the Act should be given a broad applica-
tion. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (prior possession of firearm 
sufficient for nexus between possession and commerce). See Barrett v. United States, 423 
U.S. 212 (1976); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974). A broad interpreta-
tion of the term "convicted" was specifically applied in United States v. Cody, 529 F.2d 
564, 566 (8th Cir. 1976). 
The broad reading of the statute conflicts with a general principle of statutory con-
struction which mandates that "ambiguities concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis v. United states, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) 
(citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955». See also United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336, 347 (1971). However, the Supreme Court in Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 
212 (1976), held that because the purpose of Congress was clear, there was no ambiguity 
in § 922(h)(I). As a result, there was no need to resort to the rule that penal statutes are 
to be strictly construed. [d. at 216. 
15. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943). 
16. This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in the context of a federal 
tax law which was dependent upon a state definition of "real property" in Reconstruc-
tion Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946). Looking to the congressional pur-
pose, the Court determined it could "best be accomplished by application of settled state 
rules ..• so long as •.• [they] do not patently run counter to the temIS of the Act." [d. 
at 210. 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1970) provides: 
No provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating 
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which 
such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any 
State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and 
positive conflict between such provision and the law of the 
State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently 
stand together. 
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tence of a prior conviction to the states.IS However, in the Ninth 
Circuit the question has been settled in favor of federallaw.I9 
United States v. Potts20 was the first of a series of decisions 
which ultimately led to this conclusion. Potts held that a prior 
conviction which had been expunged may be proved for the 
federal firearms control statute.21 The Potts court determined 
that the defendant's prior conviction, expunged under a Wash-
ington statute,22 had only been "partially erased."2s The major-
ity did not conclude whether state or federal law controlled. In-
stead, the case turned on the precise wording of the state statute 
which limited the scope of ~he expunction where there is a sub-
sequent prosecution.2<1 Judge Sneed concurred in the result in 
1~. This is the current interpretation in the Tenth Circuit. See United States v. 
Stober, 604 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1979), and notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text. 
See United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297, 1309-10 n.26 (5th Cir. 1978) ("in Title IV, 
by identifying those subject to the proscription of § 922(h)(i) as 'any person •.• who 
has been convicted in any court • • .,' Congress chose to rely, at least in part, on state 
criminal law. We see no reason, in either the language or legislative history of Title IV, to 
doubt that Congress adopted the state's o~ definition of conviction, including the ef-
fects of a pardon thereon."). But see, United States v. Lehman, 613 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 
1980) (citing United States v. Padia, 584 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1978). 
19. See notes 20-38 infra and accompanying text. 
20. 528 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
21. Potts was prosecuted for a violatio~ of § 1202(a) of Title VII of the Act. 
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.240 (1977). 
23. Potts overruled United States v. Hoctor, 487 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1973), which, 
according to Potts, erroneously concluded that the former conviction "was absolutely 
erased" and the defendant was "no longer a person that had been convicted of a felony." 
528 F.2d at 884. See note 24 infra. 
24. A more careful reading or"the statute in Potts reveals the statutory limitation 
overlooked by the court in Hoctor: "Provided, That in any subsequent prosecution, for 
any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved, and shall have the 
same effect as if probation had not been granted, or the information or indictment dis-
missed." WASH. REv. CODE § 9.995.240 (1977). 
In Potts the court declined to apply their decision retroactively to the defendant. 
Judge Koelsch, writing for majority, explained, 
Our decision today, overruling Hoctor, undoubtedly expands 
the scope of potential criminal liability under § 1202(a)(1). 
While Hoctor stood as the law of this circuit, a person such as 
Potts whose sole prior felony conviction had been expunged 
persuant to the Washington statute, could not reasonably'have 
suspected that his possession of a firearm . • • would consti-
tute a § 1202(11)(1) violation. As Potts lacked notice of our 
subsequently revised view of the statute, "due process fairness 
bars the retros.ctive judgment of his conduct using the ex-
panded definition." Accordingly, the rule we announce today 
must be applied prospectively only today. 
528 F.2d at 886 (citations OInitted). 
52
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/7
1981] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 205 
Potts, but not on the basis of the construction of the state ex-
punction statute. He argued that the court should look only to 
the fact that the defendant had been convicted of a felony be-
cause state expunction statutes can only remove state disabili-
ties and are ineffective under federal law.llli 
Concurring in Potts, Judge Wright voiced his concern for those similarly situated 
"whose Washington state convictions have been expunged, those 'presently on probation 
under deferred or suspended sentences, and those who are about to bargain for defer-
ment under Washington law. [d. at 887. 
Because Benson could similarly not "reasonably have suspected" that his receipt of 
a firearm would constitute a violation of the federal firearms law, one wonders why the 
court did not apply their decision prospectively only in Benson, as was done in Potts. 
The answer lies in footnote one of the majority opinion. "Benson's attack on the consti-
tutionality of § 922(h)(1) 'is expressly foreclosed by our prior opinion in United States v. 
Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 972-74 (9th Cir. 1977).''' In Haddad, the defendant argued that 
§ 922(h)(1) was unconstitutionally vague because the wording of the statute did not 
clearly state whether knowledge of receipt was an element. The court rejected this IU"gu-
ment, noting that other portions of § 922, for example 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1976), make 
knowledge an element. The Haddad court held that "knowledge is not an element of the 
crime, mere receipt is enough." 
Haddad relied on an earlier case, United States v. Crow, 439 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 
1971), vacated sub nom. Crow v. United States, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972), which held that 
the knowing possession of a firearm was unlawful without regard to whether the defen-
dant knew such possession was unlawful. In Crow, the defendant argued that he could 
not be convicted for a violation of the law if he did not know it was unlawful to possess 
the gun. 439 F.2d at 1195. The court rejected the argument because nowhere in the sec-
tion does it say "knowingly" or "intentionally." It also rejected Crow's argument that his 
conviction was foreclosed by Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Lambert in-
volved a Los Angeles ordinance which required sex offenders to register within five days 
after entering Los Angeles. Lack of knowledge in Lambert was found to be a valid de-
fense because the challenged ordinance required affirmative action. Conviction for non-
compliance was held to be a violation of due process. The court distinguished Crow from 
Lambert: 
First, merely passive conduct is not involved. To violate the 
law, one must acquire knowing possession of a firearm; second, 
when one is a convicted felon, one should in our opinion be 
alert to the possible consequences. Thus the rule that is "deep 
in our law" that ignorance of the law will not excuse is appli-
cable here. 
439 F.2d at 1196. 
As to whether this holding also mean that knowledge is not an element where one 
accused of a violation of the federal firearms law has no knowledge that he is a convicted 
felon, see note 41 infra. 
25. Judge Sneed reasoned that 
state law must be examined to determine whether the defen-
dant has been convicted of a felony. The relevant state law to 
be examined in this determination does not include the ex-
punction statutes. Such statutes do not rewrite history; they 
merely provide that previous history is immaterial for certain 
purposes under state law. It is not within the power of a state 
to make such history immaterial to the administration of the 
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The conflict between the majority opinion and Judge 
Sneed's concurrence in Potts has resulted in confusion in subse-
quent cases. In United States v. Bergeman,26 the court an-
nounced the conflict had "been resolved in favor of both view-
points. "27 The dissenlt charged that this meant only that the 
issue had been given inconsistent treatment and the court had 
"invoked both theories in later cases."28 However, the Bergeman 
court recognized that in the Ninth Circuit an individual remains 
subject to the federal restriction placed upon anyone convicted 
of a felony, regardless of subsequent state procedures provided 
to remove the disability. The Bergeman court concluded that 
federal law controls. This determination was based upon an 
analysis of Potts, as well as legislative history supporting a 
broad interpretation of the term "convicted."29 Finally the opin-
ion expressed the COltlCern that a contrary holding would result 
in a "patchwork" application of federal law resulting from varia-
tions in state expunction statutes.30 
Whether state Ol~ federal law controls was addressed in two 
earlier Ninth Circuit cases,' United States v. Pricepaul,31 and 
United States v. Locke.32 In Pricepaul the defendant argued 
federal criminal law or the interpretation of federal criminal 
statutes. Only Congress can do that. 
528 F.2d at 887. 
26. 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979). Bergeman held that expunction of a state convic-
tion under an Idaho statute did not change the defendant's status as a convicted felon 
for purposes of § 922(h)(1). 
27. [d. at 535. 
28. [d. at 538. In United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978), the court 
applied the Potts majority analysis to determine the effect of an expunction statute. 
Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1978) followed the Sneed analysis in Potts. 
The Bergeman majority asserted that the conflict had been put to rest in Hyland, where 
"the question of whether state or federal law would control a convicted felon's right to 
carry a firearm was resolved in favor of federal law." 592 F.2d at 536. This statement 
seems to contradict the earlier assertion that the conflict had been resolved "in favor of 
both viewpoints." Resolution of these inconsistencies may be possible if the court follows 
the Potts majority decision, by referring to state law to determine the existence of a 
conviction, and following the Sneed concurrence only as to the irrelevance of state post-
conviction provisions. Judge Sneed's opinion admittedly relied on the intitial conviction 
under applicable state law. 
29. 592 F.2d at 537 n.9 (citing Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1978» 
("The federal gun laws at issue here are intended to have, and should be given the 
broadest permissable application."). 
30. [d. at 537. 
31. 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1976). 
32. 542 F. 2d 800 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'g 409 F. Supp. 600 (D. Idaho 1976). 
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that his predicate conviction was invalid under California law 
and could not satisfy the prior conviction element of the federal 
firearms statute.3S The court held that the validity of the state 
conviction did not depend upon compliance with a strict state 
standard, as long as the conviction was valid under federal law. 34 
The Pricepaul court relied on Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. 
Beaver CountySIS and the Sneed analysis in PottsS6 for its deter-
mination that the federal standard should be applied.37 
In Locke,38 the issue on appeal was whether the prior con-
viction element of the federal firearms statute had been satis-
fied. Defendant Locke entered a guilty plea to a burglary charge 
and sentence was withheld for a three-year probationary period. 
The district court rejected defendant's contention that because 
judgment was withheld there had been no conviction. The dis-
trict court explained, "A withheld judgment is a judgment sub-
ject to a condition. Unless defendant complies with the condi-
tions, the judgment will not be erased. In short, defendant's 
prior conviction stands."39 
The court of appeals in Locke did not reach a conclusion 
concerning whether the prior conviction element was to be de-
termined by state or federal law. The court avoided the issue on 
appeal, stating that the district court "correctly applied the ap-
plicable state and federal law .... "'0 In Locke it was not essen-
33. Pricepaul claimed his guilty plea was not made in accordance with the California 
reading of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), as announced in In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 
122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969). For a discussion of Boykin, see notes 4649 
infra and accompanying text. 
34. According to the Pricepaul court, 
The construction of a federal statute is a matter solely of fed-
eral law, and the degree to which a federal statute incorpo-
rates or refers to 8tate law is a question of federal statutorY 
interpretation • • • • Since the California interpretation of 
Boykin is not • • • required by the federal constitution, the 
district court should apply the federal view of Boykin. 
540 F.2d at 424-25. 
35. 328 U.S. at 208. See note 16 supra. 
36. 528 F.2d at 887. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
37. 540 F.2d at 424. 
38. 409 F. Supp. 600 (D. Idaho 1976), afl'd, 542 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1976). 
39. 409 F. Supp. at 604. 
40. 542 F.2f1 at 801. The district court stated the definition of "conviction" it 
adopted: "fA] 'conviction' is the stage of a criminal proceeding where the issue of guilt is 
determined and a 'sentence' is the second stage in a criminal procedure whereupon the 
Court decrees by judgment the sentence the defendant is to receive." 409 F. Supp. at 
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tial to come to a resolution of the issue because the court found 
Locke had been convicted under state law.41 
Just weeks after the Ninth Circuit decision in Benson, the 
Tenth Circuit ruled on a closely parallel case. In United States 
v. Stober,"2 the defendant was charged with a violation of sec-
tion 922(h)(1). He was found guilty and appealed, claiming the 
prior conviction element was not satisfied by his guilty plea 
under an Oklahoma deferred judgment procedure. The ~ourt 
held that Stober had not been convicted under Oklahoma law 
and that the federal statute's requirement that a felon be 
"convicted in any court" must be met by a conviction in "the 
court which tried th~~ accused. That court was really the only 
court which could convict; if he was not guilty there, he was not 
guilty for the purpose of making his act here concerned a 
crime . . . ."43 The Tenth Circuit's reasoning, in contrast to 
'that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, requires "conviction in the 
Oklahoma Court by the Oklahoma Court. There is not issue of 
comity and no issue of preemption.""" The Stober analysis es-
tablishes that at least in the Tenth Circuit, "[t]he defendant is 
entitled to, and must, rely on the jurisdiction in which he was 
charged .. The federal courts must rely on the state to determine 
whether there was a conviction. . .. [T]he states can decide 
how to punish violations of their laws, not the federal courts."n 
Having established in the Ninth Circuit that federal law 
governs the determination of a' prior conviction under section 
922(h)(1), what is the effect of a guilty plea under federal law? 
603: The district court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of "conviction" in this 
determination. See notes 46-49 infra and accompanying text. 
41. Locke was told by a public defender that under the deferred prosecution statute 
his conviction would not be entered on his criminal record. Although Locke thought that 
he was not a convicted felon under Idaho law, and had no knowledge that he would be 
subject to federal disabilities because of his prior state violation, his conviction was up-
held on appeal. The fact that he was erroneously counselled had no significance in the 
court's analysis, because intent was not considered a factor. 592 F.2d at 801. See note 24 
supra. 
42. 604 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1979). 
43. [d. at 1276, 1277. The court also referred to the general full faith and credit 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), which requires courts to give full faith and credit to 
state legislative acts and judicial records and proceedings. 
44. 604 F.2d at 1277. 
45. [d. at 1278. 
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In Boykin v. Alabama,46 the Supreme Court declared, "A plea of 
guilty is more than a confession that the accused did various 
acts; it is itself a conviction."41 By entering a guilty plea, an ac-
cused waives important constitutional rights: the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the 
right to confront one's accusers.48 The Supreme Court held that 
a state trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea, without an af-
firmative showing that the plea was voluntary and intelligent, is 
obtained in violation of due process.49 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The brief majority opinion noted that whether Benson had 
been "convicted" under TIIinois law was unclear,lSo but flatly 
stated that "[w]hether he was convicted for purposes of 
§ 922(h)(1), however, is ultimately a question of federal law."1S1 
The panel cited, without discussion, several cases in support of 
this unequivocal determination. United States v. BergemanlSS 
and United States v. Princepaul lSs are two cases in which the 
Ninth Circuit held that federal law controls in the determination 
of a prior conviction under the federal firearms law. The major-
ity in Benson also referred to Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. 
Beaver County, M a Supreme Court case concerning the extent 
state law should be applied when incorporated by reference in a 
federal law. The opinion also listed several other Ninth Circuit 
cases which lend support to the conclusion, but which are not 
dispositive on the issue. ISIS 
Turning to the question of whether under applicable federal 
law Benson had been previously "convicted," the majority con-
sidered the legal effect of Benson's guilty plea. They relied on 
46. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
47. ld. at 242 (citing Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1926). 
48. ld. at 243 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963). 
49. 395 U.S. at 243 n.5. 
50. 605 F.2d at 1094. 
51. ld. 
52. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text. 
53. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text. 
54. 328 U.S. 204 (1946). See note 16 supra. 
55. 605 F.2d at 1094 (citing United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Locke, 542 F.2d 
800, 801 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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the Supreme Court's declaration in Boykin v. Alabama that a 
guilty plea "is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give 
judgment and determine punishment. "liS The Benson Court 
pointed out that the Illinois court explained the consequences of 
pleading guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled sub-
stance before accepting Benson's guilty plea. The majority con-
cluded that the Illinois court's acceptance of the plea and sub-
sequent sentencing constituted a "conviction" under section 
922(h)(1).1i7 Furthermore, when faced with a "similar" issue in 
United States v. Locke, the court held that under "controlling 
federal law" the defendant had been "convicted." In Locke the 
defendant was given a three-year probationary period persuant 
to a deferred judgment statute. Benson's sentence to probation 
was under a deferred prosecution statute. The opinion did not 
consider this distinction. Briefly mentioned in a footnote was the 
fact that Locke was convicted under applicable state law.lis 
Ignoring these differences, the majority found that Locke con-
trolled Benson's claim.1i9 
Judge Ely "reluctantly" concurred, solely because he be-
lieved the precedent in the Ninth Circuit was compelling. He 
nevertheless expressed his opposition to the court's conclusion 
on the ground that a state should have the "right to define and 
determine when an individual has been convicted under the 
state's law."so Accordingly, he believed the majority's holding 
had "unnecessarily and unjustifiably intruded upon a sovereign 
right that ... appropriately belongs to the states."al Judge Ely's 
contention was that because section 922 (h) (1) does not define 
the term "conviction," the determination should be left to the 
states.S2 Resolving the ambiguity in the federal statute in this 
manner would, according to Judge Ely, protect the states from 
federal intrusion. 
Judge Ely cited United States v. Bass, in which the Su-
56. 395 u.s. at 242. 
57. See 605 F.2d at 1095, suggesting that the plea was properly made in accordance 
with Boykin. However, in 1974, when Benson entered his plea, Hoctor was still the law in 
the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d at 886 (Wright J., concurring). 
58. 605 F.2d at 1095 & n.3. 
59. Id. at 1095. 
60.Id. 
6!. Id. 
62. Id. at 1096. 
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preme Court held that "unless Congress conveys its purpose 
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the 
federal-state balance."63 In addition, section 922(h)(1) is gov-
erned by section 927,64 which indicates that Congress intended 
not to intrude into "areas traditionally reserved to the states." 
Judge Ely distinguished cases arising under deferred prose-
cution statutes, such as Benson, where no judgment of convic-
tion is entered, from those arising under expunction statutes. 
However, he maintained that in either circumstance he would 
hold there was no conviction.611 In Judge Ely's opinion, "[t]he 
states enact these laws to deter recidivism and to promote the 
full rehabilitation of their citizens. In each case, the state has 
chosen to allow an individual familiar with the specific circum-
stances-the trial judge-to determine what criminal and civil 
sanction should attach."66 He argued that federal intrusion in 
this area impinges on the states' power to institute effective re-
habilitation programs and significantly changes the federal-state 
balance.67 . 
The majority did not refer to the concern for national uni-
formity in the application of the federal statute, but this is an 
issue given a great deal of weight in the cases upon which the 
majority relied. Judge Ely argued that the unstated goal of uni-
form application of the law would be unaided by the court's de-
cision. He pointed out that a felon, as defined by section 
922(h)(1), must have been convicted of a crime punishable by a 
term exceeding one year, and that penalties for crimes vary con-
siderably from state to state. Consequently, a person convicted 
of a crime in one state may be a felon within the meaning of the 
statute, although a person convicted of the same crime in an-
other state would not fall within its ambit. This situation makes 
the uniform application of the federal statute impossible, even if 
federal law determines whether or not there has been a 
conviction.68 
63. 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). 
64. See note 18 supra. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE 
Benson establishes that in the Ninth Circuit a guilty plea con-
stitutes a conviction for purposes of section 922(h)(1). The court 
did not acknowledge that its holding significantly expands the 
application of the mE~asure. No precedent was cited for finding 
the existence of a predicate "conviction" under federal law 
where the defendant was never "convicted" under applicable 
state law. Finding Benson's claim of error to be controlled by 
their earlier decision in Locke, the court avoided addressing con-
stitutional que~tions and policy concerns. 
The majority opinion did not differentiate between the ef-
fect of deferred prosecutions, where no judgment of conviction is 
ever entered, and post-conviction measures, such as pardons and 
expunction statutes which attempt to "erase" convictions. The 
underlying policy which motivates states to enact these mea-
sures is the same, an.d in many cases only the label differs.69 A 
system which allows persons to believe that criminal sanctions 
will be removed upon successful completion of their probation-
ary term, only to be told later that the federal law does not rec-
ognize the relief provided by the states, undercuts the credibility 
of government. 
Whether Benson could reasonably be expected to realize 
that he was a convicted felon within the scope of the federal 
statute is an issue which merited examination by the court. Had 
Benson been tried in the Tenth Circuit rather than the Ninth, 
following the Stober court's reasoning his conviction would have 
been reversed. Conflict among the circuits makes the statutory 
ambiguity fundamen.tally unfair. The status of the defendant as 
a convicted felon is one that should not be subject to conjecture, 
nor should it change as he moves from one jurisdiction to an-
other. One subject to disabilities under the federal law is en-
titled to notice of that disability.'1O 
69. Note, A State Pardon Does Not Inherently Remove Federal Disabilities, and 
Congress Did Not Intend State Pardons to Remove Licensing Disabilities Under the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1332, 1339 (1975) [hereinafter cited as State 
Pardon]. 
70. A criminal statute is constitutionally infirm if it "fails to give a person of ordi-
nary intelligence fair notice that his comtemplated conduct is forbidden by Statute." 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U.S. 114 (1979). 
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In the recent case of Lewis v. United States,'1l the Supreme 
Court recognized this conflict among the circuits in their inter-
pretation of the federal firearms law. In Lewis the Court held 
that an underlying conviction subject to constitutional attack 
would satisfy the prior conviction element of the federal firearms 
offense. The majority relied on the sweeping intent of the legis-
lature in enacting the measure.'12 The Lewis Court did not ad-
dress the question of the effect of a guilty plea under the federal 
statute. 
It has been argued that Congress linked federal disabilities 
to "conviction," and not guilt.'13 However, the adoption of the 
Supreme Court's definition of "conviction" in Boykin makes this 
distinction moot. The argument raises the question, however, 
whether this is the definition Congress intended for the courts to 
apply. In Boykin, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea 
constituted a conviction in order to guarantee a criminal defen-
dant would not be deprived of fundamental rights. Does the ap-
plication of the Boykin definition in Benson controvert the in-
tent of the Supreme Court or of Congress? Because of the 
conflict in the circuits as to the construction of the statute, the 
issue should be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
Bonita L. Marmor* 
71. 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980). 
72. The majority stated, "we view the language Congress chose as consistent with 
the common-sense notion that a disability based upon one's status as a convicted felon 
should cease only when the conviction upon which the status depends has been vacated." 
ld. at 918 n.5. 
The dissent argued that the statutory language was ambiguous, since it clearly does 
not reach "any person who has been convicted" because those whose convictions have 
been reversed on appeal or vacated must not be included. The dissent concluded that 
"the principle of lenity requires us to resolve any doubts against the harsher alternative 
and to read the statute to prohibit the possession of firearms only by those who have 
been constitutionally convicted of a felony. ld. at 923. 
73. State Pardons, supra note 69 at 1340-41. 
• Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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VI. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE 
In United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 
1979), a reliable informant advised DEA agents that a particular 
car was being used to smuggle narcotics into the United States. 
The car was stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint and defen-
dant, the driver of thl~ car, was taken to an office to wait for the 
arrival of the DEA agents. Two and one-half hours later the 
agents arrived, and after another thirty minutes, defendant was 
informed of his Miranda rights, and the defendant gave permis-
sion to the agents to search the car. Cocaine was discovered in a 
headlamp. Defendant was again given a Miranda warning, and 
he admitted he was paid to drive the car and that he knew the 
cocaine was hidden in. the car. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the evidence of the cocaine should have been excluded. 
Holding that the tip by the reliable informant provided a 
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, 609 F.2d at 1286 (citing 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1977», and that de-
fendant's statement and consent to the search were voluntary, 
id. (citing United States v. Dubrovsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212 (9th 
Cir. 1978», the court ruled that the evidence of the cocaine was 
inadmissable because of the delay between the initial stop and 
the consent to the search. Relying on Dunaway v. New York, 
442 U.S. 200 (1979), the court ruled that because the detention 
was so similar to an arrest, probable cause to arrest the defen-
dant was required. I][l Dunaway, the Supreme Court ruled that 
where a person is detained for the purpose of custodial interro-
gation, fourth amendlment safeguards are required. 
Having found th.at probable cause was required for the de-
tention, the Ninth Circuit applied the test of Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
108, 114 (1964), and held that the information provided by the 
informant was not sufficiently detailed to support probable 
cause. The court also ruled that the government had failed to 
. meet its burden of proving that the "taint" was sufficiently at-
tenuated to allow the evidence to be admitted. 
In United States v. Ocheltree, 622 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980), 
a DEA agent asked defendant, a traveller waiting at an airport, 
if he could search the defendant's briefcase for narcotics. The 
DEA agent told defendant that he need not consent to the 
search, but if he did not, that a search warrant would be ob-
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tained. Defendant consented, and narcotics paraphernalia were 
discovered. The agent detained defendant, obtained a search 
warrant, and found narcotics in defendant's suitcase, which de-
fendant had checked as baggage. 
The court of appeals held that the consent to the search was 
involuntary because in telling defendant that a warrant would 
be sought if defendant refused to consent to the search, the 
DEA agent implied that defendant would be kept in custody un-
til the warrant was obtained. Because the DEA agent did not 
have probable cause until the briefcase was searched, retaining 
defendant in custody would have been an unlawful arrest under 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), and consent under 
such circumstances was involuntarily given. 
In United States v. Allen, No. 79-1721 (9th Cir. 1980), DEA 
officials received a tip from an airline ticket salesperson that de-
fendant, who fit the DEA's "airport drug courier profile," had 
just purchased a roundtrip ticket from Seattle to San Francisco. 
The profile lists several characteristics believed to be commonly 
exhibited by those carrying narcotics by airplane. DEA agents 
stopped defendant when he returned to Seattle, and informed 
him that they believed he was carrying drugs. Defendant later 
consented to a body search. When no drugs were found on his 
person, the agents asked defendant if they could search the 
briefcase he was carrying. Defendant refused, and the agents 
seized the briefcase. Following the seizure, defendant made self-
incriminating statements, and in an application for a search war-
rant, the DEA agents cited these statements as supporting prob-
able cause. The search warrant was obtained several days after 
the stop, and LSD was found in the briefcase. 
The court of appeals held that the search was unjustified 
because it was unsupported by probable cause. The court found 
that the facts that defendant matched the profile and he ap-
peared nervous when approached by the agents would not lead a 
:reasonable person to believe defendant had committed a crime. 
The court noted that an innocent traveller might become ner-
vous when accused of carrying drugs. Similarly, the fact that the 
search of defendant's person revealed no contraband did not 
support an inference that defendant carried drugs in his brief-
case. Therefore, the seizure of defendant's briefcase was unjusti-
fied, and the fruits of that seizure must be excluded. 
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In Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980) 
appellant had earlier been found guilty of a crime and was sen-
tenced to a term of five years. The sentence was suspended on 
the condition that appellant forfeit all his assets to the govern-
ment and the he work for charity without pay. Appellant argued 
that these conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
Relying on United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 
259 (9th Cir. 1975), the court stated that the validity of proba-
tion conditions depends on 1) the purpose of the conditions; and 
2) whether the conditions are reasonably related to the purpose. 
Noting that rehabilitation of the criminal and protection of soci-
ety are the primary purposes of probation conditions, the court 
stated that neither punishment of the convicted nor circumven-
tion of statutory sentencing limits is a proper primary' purpose 
of probation. The court held that the cumulative effect of the 
probation conditions in this case constituted a much harsher re-
striction than necessary to rehabilitate the appellant, and the 
conditions were therE~fore impermissible. 
In United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980), 
the Ninth Circuit held that special treatment of bail conditions 
for those charged with capital offenses derive from the nature of 
the offense charged and not from the fact that the potential pen-
alty is death. 
The district court found defendant, a Federal Protective Of~ 
ficer, guilty of the ral~e and murder of a young female alien. The 
district court also found that defendant regularly wore firearms 
while at home and that he once left a note saying that he was 
going across the border. The trial court concluded that defen-
dant was a flight risk who posed a threat to other people, and 
applied 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976), which controls the granting of 
bail in cases where the defendant "is charged with an offense 
punishable by death," and denied bail. 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court failed 
to follow Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in which the 
Court proscribed the imposition of the death penalty under such 
statutes. Had the trial court properly followed Furman, defen-
dant argued, § 3146p which governs release on charges not pun-
ishable by death, would have applied. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's argument, and re- . 
fused to apply Furman to render unconstitutional all statutes 
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that were tied to capital offenses. Instead, the court looked to 
the purpose of the rule to determine if it derived from the po-
tential severity of the punishment. In this case, the court found 
that the purpose of § 3148 was to impose different bail condi-
tions for those capital crimes where the offense - and not the 
penalty - differed. Consequently, the court held that § 3148 
survived Furman and was valid. 
In United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1980), 
the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's chaIIenge that the trial 
court erroneously submitted an Allen charge to the jury. The 
defendant was charged with five counts of mail fraud. After the 
trial, the jury deliberated for over eight hours without reaching a 
verdict. The judge then instructed the jury that those jurors in 
the minority should reappraise their doubts to determine if 
those doubts were reasonable. The jury deliberated three and 
one-half hours more before returning a guilty verdict. 
On appeal, defendant argued that the judge's instruction 
constituted an Allen charge. Courts disfavor an Allen charge be-
cause it has a potentiaIIy coercive effect on the minority jury 
members to alter their views based on the perceived opinion of 
the court or the opinion of the majority, and not on the evidence 
and law. 
The Ninth Circuit held that an Allen charge exists only if 
the charge was both premature and had a coercive effect on the 
jury. The court of appeals found no evidence of a coercive effect 
in this case. Furthermore, the court distinguished United States 
v. Contretas, 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972), where coercive effect 
was found. In Contretas, following the aIIeged Allen charge, the 
jury deliberated and decided on a verdict in thirty-five minutes. 
In the present case, the jury deliberated an additional three and 
one-half hours, a sufficient time to reach a "reasoned decision." 
In United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980), the 
court of appeals held that defendant's attorney had no right to 
be present at a hearing in which customs agents sought a court 
order requiring defendant to submit to a strip search; that the 
magistrate had legal authority to issue an order compelling de-
fendant to submit to a strip search and x-ray; that, even though 
defendant's attorney was not present during a body cavity 
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search, the search did not exceed the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness standard; that defendant's seven hour detention was 
legal; and that the evidence supported the giving of the Jewell 
instruction. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
Customs officials searched defendant's baggage upon her ar-
rival at the San Francisco International Airport from Bangkok, 
Thailand. The agents found items which, when coupled with de-
fendant's awkwardness in walking and sitting, led them to sus-
pect that the defendant was carrying something in a body cavity. 
The officials asked defendant to submit to a strip search, and 
she refused. The officials then obtained a court order requiring 
defendant to submit to a strip search and x-ray. The x-ray re-
vealed a foreign body in defendant's vagina, which defendant 
voluntarily removed. The foreign body was a plastic container 
which held packets oj[ heroin. This series of events lasted about 
seven hours, part of which time defendant's attorney was pre-
sent. The trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence of 
the heroin. 
Defendant appealed on five grounds. First, defendant ar-
gued that because hel~ attorney sought and was refused access to 
contest the search order, the' government violated her due pro-
cess rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. The court 
equated the government's request for a court order to a request 
for a search warrant, traditionally, an ex parte proceeding. The 
court then held that defendant's due process rights were not 
violated. 
Second, defendant contested the magistrate's legal authority 
to issue the order for a strip search and x-ray. The court found 
that the order was based on probable cause and held that the 
magistrate had the power to issue the order pursuant to Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41. 
Third, the defendant argued that the body cavity search ex-
ceeded the fourth amendment reasonableness standard because 
her attorney was excluded. The Ninth Circuit examined the pre-
cautionary steps the customs agents took to minimize the intru-
siveness of the sear·ch. The court found that the presence of 
counsel may have been of some emotional support, but in this 
stituation, depriving defendant of this support was insufficient 
to make the search unreasonable. 
Fourth, defendant challenged the legality of the detention. 
The court stated that the legality of the detention must be de-
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termined according to what was necessary for the officials to 
conduct a legal border search. The court held that, under the 
circumstances, seven hours was not an improper length of 
detention. 
Finally, the defendant argued that an instruction regarding 
defendant's deliberate ignorance of certain facts should not have 
been given. The court compared the facts in Jewel with those in 
the present case and found sufficient basis to conclude that de-
fendant was deliberately ignorant of the contents of the plastic 
container. The court concluded that the instruction was proper. 
In United States v. Bronstein, 623 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 
1980), the Ninth Circuit held that where a plea bargain provided 
that the government waive its right of allocution and would re-
main silent at the time of sentencing except to correct factual 
misrepresentations, the government's comments concerning de-
fendant's alleged and unrelated conduct constituted a breach of 
the plea bargain and required a remand for resentencing. 
Defendant was charged with subscribing false individual 
and corporate tax returns and with conspiracy related to these 
tax offenses. On the sixth day of trial, defendant and the govern-
ment entered into a written plea bargain in which the govern-
ment waived its right of allocution and agreed to remain silent 
at the time of sentencing except to correct any factual misrepre-
sentations. The court accepted the plea bargain and set a sen-
tencing date. On that date, the trial judge asked for additional 
information regarding the Internal Revenue Service's policy on 
voluntary disclosure. Both sides presented witnesses to testify 
on this matter. The prosecution stated that they would stay 
within the limits of the plea bargain. At the conclusion of the 
trial, however, the government raised several of its arguments, 
including that the defendant had committed other wrongful 
acts. After sentencing, defendant moved to correct the sentence, 
arguing that it was imposed illegally. The motion was denied. 
On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the sentence and 
remanded the case for resentencing. The court first looked at its 
recent decision in United States v. Arnett, No. 79-1243 (9th 
Cir., Nov. 26, 1979), in which the court determined that ambigu-
ities of plea bargains must be resolved by looking at the facts to 
establish the intent of the parties. The court found Arnett inap-
plicable in this case, however, because the government argued 
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that it was staying within the limits of the agreement, and be-
cause the agreement was clear as to the intent of the parties. 
The court went on the examine the parties' conduct at the hear-
ing and found that the government's comments regarding defen-
dant's alleged and unlrelated criminal activities constituted a 
breach of the agreemeDlt. The court thus remanded the decision 
to the district court fOlr resentencing. 
In.'United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1980), 
the court held, inter alia, that the government need only make 
reasonable efforts to produce an informant, and that the failure 
to produce the informant did not violate the defendant's sixth 
amendment right to confront his accusers. Goldman, an inmate 
at the Los Angeles COUlllty Jail, agreed with a Los Angeles police 
officer that he would implicate defendant in exchange for a rec-
ommendation that he be released on his own recognizance. 
About a month later, defendant asked Goldman to learn if a cer-
tain United States district judge would grant probation to Phil 
Izsak, who was awaiting sentencing, in exchange for $75,000. 
Goldman then informed the police officer and two investiga-
tors of the proposed bribe. Eagan, one of the investigators, 
agreed to pose as the judge's girlfriend. Goldman then called de-
fendant and told him that the bribe could be arranged through 
the judge's "girlfriend." They agreed to meet. 
At the meeting, hoth Goldman and Eagen were equipped 
with transmitters. After Eagan's early departure from the meet-
ing, at which the possible bribe was discussed, defendant ex-
pressed concern that she might be an undercover agent. 
Goldman assured him that she was not. In the district court, de-
fendant was convicted. of conspiracy and of corrupt endeavoring 
to influence an officer of the court. . 
On appeal, defendant challenged the absence of Goldman 
from the trial as a deprivation of his sixth amendment right to 
confront accusers. The Ninth Circuit relied on United States v. 
Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 
(1977), in which the ICOurt held that the government need only 
use reasonable efforts to produce an informant. In this case, the 
government attempted to locate Goldman by interviewing his 
acquaintances and relatives, by issuing a warrant for his arrest 
for unlawful flight, and by inquiring at the County Coroner's Of-
fice. The court concluded that the government had expended 
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reasonable efforts to locate Goldman, and the defendant's claims 
were therefore without merit. 
In United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979), a 
person paced the length of the Seattle airport, tightly holding a 
briefcase. Subsequently, he met with defendant and both pur-
chased one-way tickets to Los Angeles with cash. Narcotics 
agents who had observed the two became suspicious and called 
in to a narcotics computer. They learned that defendant\i)was a 
known drug trafficker. The agents contacted Los Angeles narcot-
ics agents and advised them to watch for the two. 
The Los Angeles agents followed the two men to a building 
near a beach, and the next morning, when the two men returned 
to Seattle, four agents were waiting for them at the airport. One 
agent followed them into a rest room and observed defendant go 
into a stall, lift one leg, and then the other. The agents stopped 
the men as they walked through the airport. According to the 
agents, both men agreed to accompany the agents to an inter-
viewing room. 
One agent took defendant into an interview room, gave him 
a Miranda warning, and conducted a weapons search. On defen-
dant's leg the agent felt bulges, which the agent subsequently 
determined to be bags of cocaine. The trial court found the stop 
and seizure reasonable and well founded. The Ninth Circuit 
agreed. 
The court of appeals first decided that the initial investiga-
tive stop was justified. An investigative stop must be based on a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to 
commit a criminal act. Here, the court found that because the 
agents were trained to spot drug dealers, and defendant's actions 
(a nervous manner, purchase of tickets with cash to a major drug 
center, virtually immediate return flight, and travelling without 
luggage) fit the profile of a drug trafficker, the initial stop was 
reasonable. 
The court then addressed defendant's challenge that the in-
itial stop became a constructive arrest when the agents brought 
him to an interview room. The court held that a justified stop 
does not become unjustified when the investigating officer moves 
the stop to a more congenial place. 
Finally, defendant argued that the pat-down search was im-
proper because the agents had no reasonable belief that defen-
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dant was armed. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, 
holding that the very nature of the crime defendant was sus-
pected of gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant may 
be armed. Rejecting defendant's arguments that because the 
agents did not search him at the initial stop they had no reason-
able suspicion that he was armed and that the search in the 
room was not based on any reasonable suspicion, the court held 
that a single agent in a closed room need not be certain that 
defendant is armed before a limited pat-down search is justified. 
In United States D. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1979), a 
narcotics agent saw an unidentified suitcase which had appar-
ently fallen from a conveyor belt in an airport. The detective 
informed an airline employee, who could not find anyone who 
could identify the suitcase. The detective then accompanied the 
employee to a private area where the employee attempted to 
open the suitcase to determine its owner. The detective then 
tapped or kicked the suitcase, and its lock opened. A revolver 
and twenty-three powlds of cocaine were inside the suitcase. In 
Los Angeles, defendant reported a lost suitcase which matched 
the description of the suitcase found by the detective. The suit-
case was delivered to defendant, and she was subsequently 
arrested. 
The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence supported the 
lower court's finding that the search was a private one initiated 
by the airline employee. The defendant claimed that the pres-
ence and assistance of the detective rendered the search a gov-
ernmental one, and that constitutional safeguards were required. 
The court disagreed, and found the detective's "slight" partici-
pation insufficient to convert the private search into a govern-
mental one. 
Judge Hug dissented and argued that the detective's ex-
treme interest in the suitcase was motivated by a desire to 
search the suitcase fOll" contraband under the guise of an author-
ized private search. 
In United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980), 
defendant waited in B. car while the co-defendant robbed a bank. 
Police apprehended both men shortly thereafter. Immediately 
following the arrest, the police searched the car and discovered a 
70
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/7
1981] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 223 
u 
paper bag containing all the stolen money and a hand gun. The 
police then impounded the car for further inspection. 
On appeal, defendant argued that the police were not justi-
fied in searching the car without a warrant at the place of appre-
hension. The Ninth Circuit relied on Chambers v. Mississippi, 
399 U.S. 42 (1970) in which the Supreme Court upheld a war-
rantless search because there was probable cause and there was 
a danger that the car would be moved. The court decided that 
Chambers was indistinguishable from the present case. The 
court found that the police did not intend to impound the car 
until a time after they discovered the bag. Consequently, at the 
time of the search the automobile was not, as the defendant had 
claimed, within the police's "complete and exclusive possession." 
Defendant also argued that the warrantless search of the 
bag found in the automobile violated his fourth amendment 
rights. The defendant cited Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753 
(1979), where the Court upheld a constitutional attack on a war-
rantless search of a suitcase. The Ninth Circuit rejected defen-
dant's claim, finding a substantial difference between the pri-
vacy interest in a suitcase and that in a paper bag. 
Dissenting, Judge Tang saw the majority's analysis of the 
warrantless bag search as "inverted." He argued that the burden 
of proof should have been on the government to justify the war-
rantless search. Instead, the majority had placed the burden on 
defendant to prove a warrant should have been required. The 
dissent added than an attempt to justify the search of the bag 
under the automobile exception would be erroneous. In any 
event, the dissent argued that the government had failed in 
meeting its burden. 
In United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979), 
one Ferrer was indicted for conspiracy to smuggle cocaine. De-
fendant testified at the grand jury hearing. The prosecutor, how-
ever, focused on defendant's conversation with a narcotics agent, 
and not on his own acquaintance with several of the defendants 
in the hearing. . 
Two years later, a second grand jury reviewed defendant's 
testimony in the first grand jury hearing. Several witnesses also 
testified. One witness' testimony consisted almost exclusively of 
responses to the prosecutor's leading questions. The prosecutor 
even responded to several of his own questions. The second 
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grand jury indicted the defendant and defendant moved to dis-
miss the indictment. 
Nine days prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss the 
indictment, the prosecutor attempted to "sanitize" defendant's 
indictment by leaving one thousand pages of transcript with a 
third grand jury. He told this grand jury, off the record, to re-
turn a decision in eight days. One live witness testified and in 
seven days the third grand jury indicted the defendant. 
The district court orally gran~d defendant's motion to dis-
miss in March 1978. The court, however, did not give a written 
decision until two months later. The government filed its notice 
of appeal in June. 
The Ninth Circuit was first faced with the question whether 
the government filed its notice of appeal "within thirty days af-
ter the entry of judgment" as required by Federal Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 4(b). The court looked at the lower court's in-
tent that its order not be final until it issued a written order. 
The court recognized the potential for an oral order to be final if 
intended as such. In thls case, however, the district court's in-
tent was clear. Consequently, the government's notice of appeal 
was held timely filed. . 
In addressing the more complicated issue of grand jury bias, 
the Ninth Circuit first distinguished its earlier decision in 
United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 825 (1977). The Chanen court reversed a dismissal of 
an indictment where, like Samango, there were three grand jury 
hearings and two indictments. In Chanen, however, the tran-
scripts from earlier hellrings were read aloud, the prosecutor ad-
vised the jurors of inconsistent testimony, and the transcripts 
contained witness confessions of giving false affidavits. 
In the instant case, none of the above safeguards was given. 
Consequently, the court did not know if the lengthy transcript 
had been examined at all. Furthermore, the jurors of the later 
jury coUld not weigh the credibility of the various witnesses with 
nothing more than the one thousand page transcript. The Ninth 
Circuit also consideredl other factors, such as the improtance of a 
fair grand jury hearing, the lack of time for "thorough, thought-
ful, and independent evaluation of the evidence" by the jurors, 
and the prejudicial impact of the one live witness. Taking into 
consideration all of these factors, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court properly invoked its supervisory power to dismiss 
the indictment. 
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